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Stanford Research into the Impact of Tobacco Advertising

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Tar

Light – img3052

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The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Super Light – img3128

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The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Super Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which are supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Common among these ads is futuristic imagery presenting Super Lights as scientifically advanced and thus engineered to be healthier and safer. However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes were marketed at varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light,” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories which extended across cigarette brands. The “Super Light” designation seems to have been more fluid and less extensive in its reach, though a variety of brands have used the designation over the past few decades.

In the late 1970s, Kool manufactured a “Super Light” category of cigarettes at 9 mg of tar (later 7 mg). Then, in 1981, Brown & Williamson switched this designation from ” Kool Super Lights” to ”Kool Milds.” In the late 1980s, the category came back when Philip Morris adopted the “Super Light” designation for its Philip Morris brand in European countries. Then, in the mid-1990s, Lorillard marketed Kent Super Lights (6 mg tar) in foreign markets as their lowest tar-delivery cigarette, alongside Kent Milds KS (11mg) and Kent Special Milds (8 mg). Merit also had a “SuperLight” cigarette, which its makers claimed “tastes as good as the leading ultra lights but has half the tar.”

Super Light cigarettes, like Lights and Ultra Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Ultra Light – img3144

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The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Ultra Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which is supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Sometimes referred to simply as “Ultra” cigarettes, Ultra Lights came into popularity in the early 1980s, and generally reported about half the tar and nicotine content of ordinary Light cigarettes. Many of the ads within this theme present ultra lights as carefree, However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes came in varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories that extended across cigarette brands.

Ultra Light cigarettes, like Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation: Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. A 2007 ad for Pall Mall, featured in this theme, reveals that the tobacco companies were prepared for this change: “BRIGHT NOW. Introducing Orange Box for Ultra Light.” The other designations and their corresponding pack colors are also featured so that consumers could figure out which color indicated which “health” designation for future purchases.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Low Tar – img3207

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Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.

It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.

Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

Early Black Ads – img4876

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As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Doctors Hawk Cigarettes – img0132

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In the first half of the 20th century, tobacco companies were forthright with their health claims, featuring doctors hawking cigarettes or cigars in many of their ads. Consumers who saw these ads were made to feel that they would be following the doctor’s orders to achieve health or fitness if they were to smoke the cigarettes advertised. Today, these nefarious health claims in tobacco ads are no longer so obvious; now, often words like “pleasure” or “alive” are keywords which indicate healthfulness. Doctors are no longer represented hawking cigarettes in ads, but the past audacity of tobacco companies is just as relevant in modern times.

At the time when many of these ads were printed, the public was worried about throat irritation due to smoking, and tobacco companies hoped that support from physicians would ease general concern. The none-too-subtle message was that if the throat doctor, with all of his expertise, recommended a particular brand, then it must be safe. Unlike with celebrity and athlete endorsers, the doctors depicted were almost never specific individuals, because physicians who engaged in advertising would risk losing their license. It was contrary to accepted medical ethics at the time for doctors to advertise, but that did not deter tobacco companies from hiring handsome talent, dressing them up to look like doctors, and printing their photographs alongside recommendations. These images always presented an idealized physician – wise, noble, and caring. This genre of ads regularly appeared in medical journals such as the Journal of the American Medical Association, an organization which for decades collaborated closely with the industry. The big push to document health hazards also did not appear until later.

In this theme, countless brands depict doctors hawking tobacco products in order to present the brand as healthful rather than harmful – An early Old Gold ad shows a doctor lighting a woman’s cigarette as a “prescription for pleasure” (1938), Viceroy depicts doctors recommending the Viceroy brand (1950, 1953), and countless depictions of doctors recommend Ricoro, Gerard, or other brands of cigars. It is ironic that in the process, they all manage to reveal the negative potential of tobacco by providing the consumer with the concept of an unhealthy cigarette or cigar in the first place.

Belair Classics – img7767

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When menthol cigarettes were first brought to market, they were advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough. However, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to increased efforts marketing its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool (1). Government surveys in 2011 revealed that menthol cigarettes dominate 30% of the overall market, and over 80% of black smokers prefer menthol as opposed to 22% of non-Hispanic white smokers (2).

Recent menthol ads are clearly marketed toward a younger, urban demographic. Many of the ads feature models of a variety of ethnicities, and African Americans are particularly targeted. Recent Salem ads from the 2000s feature the slogan, “Stir the senses,” and each ad depicts a model smoking in green, mentholated ecstasy. Other Salem ads from the 2000s reveal clear youth targeting through a risk-taking appeal. For example, one of the ads presents an “underground” party, another presents a couple with an intertwining, extreme tattoo, and a third presents a scantily clad woman riding on the back of a man’s motorcycle – all in urban settings.

Kool’s advertisements from 2005 used the slogan “Be True,” which urged consumers to not only be true to themselves, but also to be true and loyal to the brand. Accompanying the “Be True” slogan was a variety of phrases such as “Be Passionate,” “Be Original,” “Be Smooth,” and “Be Bold,” all of which appeal to adolescents and young adults trying to “find themselves” and develop a sense of self. The “Be True” ads largely feature musicians, ranging from guitar players to disc jockeys, and their ethnicities are also noticeably diverse. In our collection, Asians, African Americans, and Caucasians are all represented in the “Be True” ad campaign. Other Kool campaigns from the 2000s, like “House of Menthol,” are more transparently urban-oriented, featuring boom boxes, speaker systems, microphones, graffiti, or skyscrapers. A subset of these ads features the “Kool Mixx” which claims to “celebrate the soundtrack to the streets” through limited edition cigarette packs. Urban youth were clearly a priority.

1. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

2. Wilson, Duff. “Advisory Panel urges F.D.A. to re-examine menthol in cigarettes.” The New York Times. 18 March 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/business/19tobacco.html

Other Menthol Classics – img11265

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When menthol cigarettes were first brought to market, they were advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough. However, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to increased efforts marketing its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool (1). Government surveys in 2011 revealed that menthol cigarettes dominate 30% of the overall market, and over 80% of black smokers prefer menthol as opposed to 22% of non-Hispanic white smokers (2).

Recent menthol ads are clearly marketed toward a younger, urban demographic. Many of the ads feature models of a variety of ethnicities, and African Americans are particularly targeted. Recent Salem ads from the 2000s feature the slogan, “Stir the senses,” and each ad depicts a model smoking in green, mentholated ecstasy. Other Salem ads from the 2000s reveal clear youth targeting through a risk-taking appeal. For example, one of the ads presents an “underground” party, another presents a couple with an intertwining, extreme tattoo, and a third presents a scantily clad woman riding on the back of a man’s motorcycle – all in urban settings.

Kool’s advertisements from 2005 used the slogan “Be True,” which urged consumers to not only be true to themselves, but also to be true and loyal to the brand. Accompanying the “Be True” slogan was a variety of phrases such as “Be Passionate,” “Be Original,” “Be Smooth,” and “Be Bold,” all of which appeal to adolescents and young adults trying to “find themselves” and develop a sense of self. The “Be True” ads largely feature musicians, ranging from guitar players to disc jockeys, and their ethnicities are also noticeably diverse. In our collection, Asians, African Americans, and Caucasians are all represented in the “Be True” ad campaign. Other Kool campaigns from the 2000s, like “House of Menthol,” are more transparently urban-oriented, featuring boom boxes, speaker systems, microphones, graffiti, or skyscrapers. A subset of these ads features the “Kool Mixx” which claims to “celebrate the soundtrack to the streets” through limited edition cigarette packs. Urban youth were clearly a priority.

1. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

2. Wilson, Duff. “Advisory Panel urges F.D.A. to re-examine menthol in cigarettes.” The New York Times. 18 March 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/business/19tobacco.html

Super Light – img3129

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The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Super Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which are supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Common among these ads is futuristic imagery presenting Super Lights as scientifically advanced and thus engineered to be healthier and safer. However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes were marketed at varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light,” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories which extended across cigarette brands. The “Super Light” designation seems to have been more fluid and less extensive in its reach, though a variety of brands have used the designation over the past few decades.

In the late 1970s, Kool manufactured a “Super Light” category of cigarettes at 9 mg of tar (later 7 mg). Then, in 1981, Brown & Williamson switched this designation from ” Kool Super Lights” to ”Kool Milds.” In the late 1980s, the category came back when Philip Morris adopted the “Super Light” designation for its Philip Morris brand in European countries. Then, in the mid-1990s, Lorillard marketed Kent Super Lights (6 mg tar) in foreign markets as their lowest tar-delivery cigarette, alongside Kent Milds KS (11mg) and Kent Special Milds (8 mg). Merit also had a “SuperLight” cigarette, which its makers claimed “tastes as good as the leading ultra lights but has half the tar.”

Super Light cigarettes, like Lights and Ultra Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Ultra Light – img3145

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The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Ultra Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which is supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Sometimes referred to simply as “Ultra” cigarettes, Ultra Lights came into popularity in the early 1980s, and generally reported about half the tar and nicotine content of ordinary Light cigarettes. Many of the ads within this theme present ultra lights as carefree, However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes came in varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories that extended across cigarette brands.

Ultra Light cigarettes, like Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation: Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. A 2007 ad for Pall Mall, featured in this theme, reveals that the tobacco companies were prepared for this change: “BRIGHT NOW. Introducing Orange Box for Ultra Light.” The other designations and their corresponding pack colors are also featured so that consumers could figure out which color indicated which “health” designation for future purchases.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Low Tar – img3208

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Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.

It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.

Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

Doctors Hawk Cigarettes – img0133

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In the first half of the 20th century, tobacco companies were forthright with their health claims, featuring doctors hawking cigarettes or cigars in many of their ads. Consumers who saw these ads were made to feel that they would be following the doctor’s orders to achieve health or fitness if they were to smoke the cigarettes advertised. Today, these nefarious health claims in tobacco ads are no longer so obvious; now, often words like “pleasure” or “alive” are keywords which indicate healthfulness. Doctors are no longer represented hawking cigarettes in ads, but the past audacity of tobacco companies is just as relevant in modern times.

At the time when many of these ads were printed, the public was worried about throat irritation due to smoking, and tobacco companies hoped that support from physicians would ease general concern. The none-too-subtle message was that if the throat doctor, with all of his expertise, recommended a particular brand, then it must be safe. Unlike with celebrity and athlete endorsers, the doctors depicted were almost never specific individuals, because physicians who engaged in advertising would risk losing their license. It was contrary to accepted medical ethics at the time for doctors to advertise, but that did not deter tobacco companies from hiring handsome talent, dressing them up to look like doctors, and printing their photographs alongside recommendations. These images always presented an idealized physician – wise, noble, and caring. This genre of ads regularly appeared in medical journals such as the Journal of the American Medical Association, an organization which for decades collaborated closely with the industry. The big push to document health hazards also did not appear until later.

In this theme, countless brands depict doctors hawking tobacco products in order to present the brand as healthful rather than harmful – An early Old Gold ad shows a doctor lighting a woman’s cigarette as a “prescription for pleasure” (1938), Viceroy depicts doctors recommending the Viceroy brand (1950, 1953), and countless depictions of doctors recommend Ricoro, Gerard, or other brands of cigars. It is ironic that in the process, they all manage to reveal the negative potential of tobacco by providing the consumer with the concept of an unhealthy cigarette or cigar in the first place.

Belair Classics – img7727

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When menthol cigarettes were first brought to market, they were advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough. However, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to increased efforts marketing its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool (1). Government surveys in 2011 revealed that menthol cigarettes dominate 30% of the overall market, and over 80% of black smokers prefer menthol as opposed to 22% of non-Hispanic white smokers (2).

Recent menthol ads are clearly marketed toward a younger, urban demographic. Many of the ads feature models of a variety of ethnicities, and African Americans are particularly targeted. Recent Salem ads from the 2000s feature the slogan, “Stir the senses,” and each ad depicts a model smoking in green, mentholated ecstasy. Other Salem ads from the 2000s reveal clear youth targeting through a risk-taking appeal. For example, one of the ads presents an “underground” party, another presents a couple with an intertwining, extreme tattoo, and a third presents a scantily clad woman riding on the back of a man’s motorcycle – all in urban settings.

Kool’s advertisements from 2005 used the slogan “Be True,” which urged consumers to not only be true to themselves, but also to be true and loyal to the brand. Accompanying the “Be True” slogan was a variety of phrases such as “Be Passionate,” “Be Original,” “Be Smooth,” and “Be Bold,” all of which appeal to adolescents and young adults trying to “find themselves” and develop a sense of self. The “Be True” ads largely feature musicians, ranging from guitar players to disc jockeys, and their ethnicities are also noticeably diverse. In our collection, Asians, African Americans, and Caucasians are all represented in the “Be True” ad campaign. Other Kool campaigns from the 2000s, like “House of Menthol,” are more transparently urban-oriented, featuring boom boxes, speaker systems, microphones, graffiti, or skyscrapers. A subset of these ads features the “Kool Mixx” which claims to “celebrate the soundtrack to the streets” through limited edition cigarette packs. Urban youth were clearly a priority.

1. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

2. Wilson, Duff. “Advisory Panel urges F.D.A. to re-examine menthol in cigarettes.” The New York Times. 18 March 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/business/19tobacco.html

Light – img3057

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The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Super Light – img3130

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The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Super Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which are supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Common among these ads is futuristic imagery presenting Super Lights as scientifically advanced and thus engineered to be healthier and safer. However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes were marketed at varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light,” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories which extended across cigarette brands. The “Super Light” designation seems to have been more fluid and less extensive in its reach, though a variety of brands have used the designation over the past few decades.

In the late 1970s, Kool manufactured a “Super Light” category of cigarettes at 9 mg of tar (later 7 mg). Then, in 1981, Brown & Williamson switched this designation from ” Kool Super Lights” to ”Kool Milds.” In the late 1980s, the category came back when Philip Morris adopted the “Super Light” designation for its Philip Morris brand in European countries. Then, in the mid-1990s, Lorillard marketed Kent Super Lights (6 mg tar) in foreign markets as their lowest tar-delivery cigarette, alongside Kent Milds KS (11mg) and Kent Special Milds (8 mg). Merit also had a “SuperLight” cigarette, which its makers claimed “tastes as good as the leading ultra lights but has half the tar.”

Super Light cigarettes, like Lights and Ultra Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Ultra Light – img3146

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The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Ultra Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which is supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Sometimes referred to simply as “Ultra” cigarettes, Ultra Lights came into popularity in the early 1980s, and generally reported about half the tar and nicotine content of ordinary Light cigarettes. Many of the ads within this theme present ultra lights as carefree, However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes came in varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories that extended across cigarette brands.

Ultra Light cigarettes, like Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation: Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. A 2007 ad for Pall Mall, featured in this theme, reveals that the tobacco companies were prepared for this change: “BRIGHT NOW. Introducing Orange Box for Ultra Light.” The other designations and their corresponding pack colors are also featured so that consumers could figure out which color indicated which “health” designation for future purchases.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Low Tar – img3209

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Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.

It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.

Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

Dentist Recommends – img0164

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Along with doctors and nurses, dentists presented yet another health professional that had the potential to reassure consumers worried about the ill health effects of smoking. Whereas otolaryngologists (ear, nose, and throat doctors) could assure “mildness” for throats, the recommendation from a dentist might indicate fewer cosmetic mouth side effects for the advertised brands. The none-too-subtle message was that if the dentist, with all of his expertise in oral care, chose to smoke a particular brand or recommended a particular brand, then it must be safe. Dentists were seen as experts not only in suffering throats, but also in such side effects as yellowed teeth, bad breath, and oral cancer. Well-known early victims of oral cancer include Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who developed cancer of the palate after years of smoking 20 cigars a day; U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), who passed away from tongue cancer; and U.S. President Grover Cleveland (1837-1908), who suffered from cancer of the palate in 1893. Though President Cleveland successfully had the cancer surgically removed, he ultimately died of a heart attack 15 years later.

Super Light – img3131

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The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Super Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which are supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Common among these ads is futuristic imagery presenting Super Lights as scientifically advanced and thus engineered to be healthier and safer. However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes were marketed at varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light,” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories which extended across cigarette brands. The “Super Light” designation seems to have been more fluid and less extensive in its reach, though a variety of brands have used the designation over the past few decades.

In the late 1970s, Kool manufactured a “Super Light” category of cigarettes at 9 mg of tar (later 7 mg). Then, in 1981, Brown & Williamson switched this designation from ” Kool Super Lights” to ”Kool Milds.” In the late 1980s, the category came back when Philip Morris adopted the “Super Light” designation for its Philip Morris brand in European countries. Then, in the mid-1990s, Lorillard marketed Kent Super Lights (6 mg tar) in foreign markets as their lowest tar-delivery cigarette, alongside Kent Milds KS (11mg) and Kent Special Milds (8 mg). Merit also had a “SuperLight” cigarette, which its makers claimed “tastes as good as the leading ultra lights but has half the tar.”

Super Light cigarettes, like Lights and Ultra Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Low Tar – img3210

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Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.

It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.

Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

Light – img8026

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The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Dentist Recommends – img0165

by

Along with doctors and nurses, dentists presented yet another health professional that had the potential to reassure consumers worried about the ill health effects of smoking. Whereas otolaryngologists (ear, nose, and throat doctors) could assure “mildness” for throats, the recommendation from a dentist might indicate fewer cosmetic mouth side effects for the advertised brands. The none-too-subtle message was that if the dentist, with all of his expertise in oral care, chose to smoke a particular brand or recommended a particular brand, then it must be safe. Dentists were seen as experts not only in suffering throats, but also in such side effects as yellowed teeth, bad breath, and oral cancer. Well-known early victims of oral cancer include Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who developed cancer of the palate after years of smoking 20 cigars a day; U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), who passed away from tongue cancer; and U.S. President Grover Cleveland (1837-1908), who suffered from cancer of the palate in 1893. Though President Cleveland successfully had the cancer surgically removed, he ultimately died of a heart attack 15 years later.

Super Light – img3132

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The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Super Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which are supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Common among these ads is futuristic imagery presenting Super Lights as scientifically advanced and thus engineered to be healthier and safer. However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes were marketed at varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light,” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories which extended across cigarette brands. The “Super Light” designation seems to have been more fluid and less extensive in its reach, though a variety of brands have used the designation over the past few decades.

In the late 1970s, Kool manufactured a “Super Light” category of cigarettes at 9 mg of tar (later 7 mg). Then, in 1981, Brown & Williamson switched this designation from ” Kool Super Lights” to ”Kool Milds.” In the late 1980s, the category came back when Philip Morris adopted the “Super Light” designation for its Philip Morris brand in European countries. Then, in the mid-1990s, Lorillard marketed Kent Super Lights (6 mg tar) in foreign markets as their lowest tar-delivery cigarette, alongside Kent Milds KS (11mg) and Kent Special Milds (8 mg). Merit also had a “SuperLight” cigarette, which its makers claimed “tastes as good as the leading ultra lights but has half the tar.”

Super Light cigarettes, like Lights and Ultra Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Low Tar – img3211

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Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.

It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.

Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

Dentist Recommends – img0166

by

Along with doctors and nurses, dentists presented yet another health professional that had the potential to reassure consumers worried about the ill health effects of smoking. Whereas otolaryngologists (ear, nose, and throat doctors) could assure “mildness” for throats, the recommendation from a dentist might indicate fewer cosmetic mouth side effects for the advertised brands. The none-too-subtle message was that if the dentist, with all of his expertise in oral care, chose to smoke a particular brand or recommended a particular brand, then it must be safe. Dentists were seen as experts not only in suffering throats, but also in such side effects as yellowed teeth, bad breath, and oral cancer. Well-known early victims of oral cancer include Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who developed cancer of the palate after years of smoking 20 cigars a day; U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), who passed away from tongue cancer; and U.S. President Grover Cleveland (1837-1908), who suffered from cancer of the palate in 1893. Though President Cleveland successfully had the cancer surgically removed, he ultimately died of a heart attack 15 years later.

Protects Your Health – img7951

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This theme features a variety of ads professing health benefits for filter cigarettes, although filters did little to truly reduce the hazards of smoking. Indeed, tobacco industry chemists were well aware that most filters actually removed no more tar and nicotine than would the same length of tobacco. However, a series of Reader’s Digest articles worked to publicize these dubious health claims for filters in the 1950s.

One such article, entitled “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” (1950), notes that artificial filters “take out some nicotine” since people are “aware that nicotine is a killer” (1). The article states that silica-gel cartridges remove 60% of nicotine from cigarettes. This article spurred Viceroy to print advertisements a week later which read, “Reader's Digest tells why filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health.” These health claims sparked a boom in Viceroy cigarette sales as well as an onslaught of new filter cigarette brands flooding the market. Kent was introduced in 1952 with a filter made of treated asbestos on crepe paper. In 1953, L&M followed with a “miracle tip” and Philip Morris advertised its di-ethylene glycol (Di-Gl) filter cigarette as “the cigarette that takes the FEAR out of smoking.” In the next two years, Marlboro was re-released as a filter cigarette which targeted men (it had previously been a cigarette targeting women, with a “beauty tip to protect the lips”), and Winston was introduced with a hefty advertising budget of $15 million.

Leading the pack with health claims was Kent, with ads that read, “What a wonderful feeling to know that Kent filters best of all leading filter cigarettes!” (1958) and “You’ll feel better about smoking with the taste of Kent!” (1961). Ironically, Kent’s filter contained asbestos, a mineral known to cause mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. In fact, the asbestos in Kent’s filter was crocidolite asbestos (also known as blue asbestos), which is often considered the deadliest form of the fibrous mineral.

1. Riis, R.W. Reader’s Digest. “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” 7 Jan 1999. .

Super Light – img3133

by

The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Super Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which are supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Common among these ads is futuristic imagery presenting Super Lights as scientifically advanced and thus engineered to be healthier and safer. However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes were marketed at varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light,” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories which extended across cigarette brands. The “Super Light” designation seems to have been more fluid and less extensive in its reach, though a variety of brands have used the designation over the past few decades.

In the late 1970s, Kool manufactured a “Super Light” category of cigarettes at 9 mg of tar (later 7 mg). Then, in 1981, Brown & Williamson switched this designation from ” Kool Super Lights” to ”Kool Milds.” In the late 1980s, the category came back when Philip Morris adopted the “Super Light” designation for its Philip Morris brand in European countries. Then, in the mid-1990s, Lorillard marketed Kent Super Lights (6 mg tar) in foreign markets as their lowest tar-delivery cigarette, alongside Kent Milds KS (11mg) and Kent Special Milds (8 mg). Merit also had a “SuperLight” cigarette, which its makers claimed “tastes as good as the leading ultra lights but has half the tar.”

Super Light cigarettes, like Lights and Ultra Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Ultra Light – img3148

by

The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Ultra Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which is supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Sometimes referred to simply as “Ultra” cigarettes, Ultra Lights came into popularity in the early 1980s, and generally reported about half the tar and nicotine content of ordinary Light cigarettes. Many of the ads within this theme present ultra lights as carefree, However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes came in varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories that extended across cigarette brands.

Ultra Light cigarettes, like Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation: Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. A 2007 ad for Pall Mall, featured in this theme, reveals that the tobacco companies were prepared for this change: “BRIGHT NOW. Introducing Orange Box for Ultra Light.” The other designations and their corresponding pack colors are also featured so that consumers could figure out which color indicated which “health” designation for future purchases.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Low Tar – img3212

by

Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.

It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.

Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

Dentist Recommends – img0167

by

Along with doctors and nurses, dentists presented yet another health professional that had the potential to reassure consumers worried about the ill health effects of smoking. Whereas otolaryngologists (ear, nose, and throat doctors) could assure “mildness” for throats, the recommendation from a dentist might indicate fewer cosmetic mouth side effects for the advertised brands. The none-too-subtle message was that if the dentist, with all of his expertise in oral care, chose to smoke a particular brand or recommended a particular brand, then it must be safe. Dentists were seen as experts not only in suffering throats, but also in such side effects as yellowed teeth, bad breath, and oral cancer. Well-known early victims of oral cancer include Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who developed cancer of the palate after years of smoking 20 cigars a day; U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), who passed away from tongue cancer; and U.S. President Grover Cleveland (1837-1908), who suffered from cancer of the palate in 1893. Though President Cleveland successfully had the cancer surgically removed, he ultimately died of a heart attack 15 years later.

Light – img3075

by

The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Super Light – img3134

by

The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Super Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which are supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Common among these ads is futuristic imagery presenting Super Lights as scientifically advanced and thus engineered to be healthier and safer. However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes were marketed at varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light,” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories which extended across cigarette brands. The “Super Light” designation seems to have been more fluid and less extensive in its reach, though a variety of brands have used the designation over the past few decades.

In the late 1970s, Kool manufactured a “Super Light” category of cigarettes at 9 mg of tar (later 7 mg). Then, in 1981, Brown & Williamson switched this designation from ” Kool Super Lights” to ”Kool Milds.” In the late 1980s, the category came back when Philip Morris adopted the “Super Light” designation for its Philip Morris brand in European countries. Then, in the mid-1990s, Lorillard marketed Kent Super Lights (6 mg tar) in foreign markets as their lowest tar-delivery cigarette, alongside Kent Milds KS (11mg) and Kent Special Milds (8 mg). Merit also had a “SuperLight” cigarette, which its makers claimed “tastes as good as the leading ultra lights but has half the tar.”

Super Light cigarettes, like Lights and Ultra Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Low Tar – img3213

by

Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.

It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.

Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

Dentist Recommends – img0168

by

Along with doctors and nurses, dentists presented yet another health professional that had the potential to reassure consumers worried about the ill health effects of smoking. Whereas otolaryngologists (ear, nose, and throat doctors) could assure “mildness” for throats, the recommendation from a dentist might indicate fewer cosmetic mouth side effects for the advertised brands. The none-too-subtle message was that if the dentist, with all of his expertise in oral care, chose to smoke a particular brand or recommended a particular brand, then it must be safe. Dentists were seen as experts not only in suffering throats, but also in such side effects as yellowed teeth, bad breath, and oral cancer. Well-known early victims of oral cancer include Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who developed cancer of the palate after years of smoking 20 cigars a day; U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), who passed away from tongue cancer; and U.S. President Grover Cleveland (1837-1908), who suffered from cancer of the palate in 1893. Though President Cleveland successfully had the cancer surgically removed, he ultimately died of a heart attack 15 years later.

Light – img3102

by

The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Super Light – img3135

by

The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Super Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which are supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Common among these ads is futuristic imagery presenting Super Lights as scientifically advanced and thus engineered to be healthier and safer. However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes were marketed at varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light,” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories which extended across cigarette brands. The “Super Light” designation seems to have been more fluid and less extensive in its reach, though a variety of brands have used the designation over the past few decades.

In the late 1970s, Kool manufactured a “Super Light” category of cigarettes at 9 mg of tar (later 7 mg). Then, in 1981, Brown & Williamson switched this designation from ” Kool Super Lights” to ”Kool Milds.” In the late 1980s, the category came back when Philip Morris adopted the “Super Light” designation for its Philip Morris brand in European countries. Then, in the mid-1990s, Lorillard marketed Kent Super Lights (6 mg tar) in foreign markets as their lowest tar-delivery cigarette, alongside Kent Milds KS (11mg) and Kent Special Milds (8 mg). Merit also had a “SuperLight” cigarette, which its makers claimed “tastes as good as the leading ultra lights but has half the tar.”

Super Light cigarettes, like Lights and Ultra Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Pink eCigs – img18030

by

Electronic Cigarette (e-cig) companies are targeting women through female only brands such as Vapor Couture and Luli, as well as through dual sex brands such as V2 Cigs, Veppo, and Fin. In the case of the latter, some e-cig companies resort to advertisements that feature highly successful and independent women carrying out activities that have for long been considered the bastion of men. In the case of the former, e-cig companies market to women through advertisements that suggest girly, playful and stylish themes.

In these ads it is common to see pink e-cigs placed next to a bunch of red roses, or lipstick tubes, and compact containers. The intent of the imagery is to allow women to associate e-cigs as a harmless fashion accessory that is as important and essential as a makeup mirror or a tube of lipstick.

A common ploy adopted by many of the e-cig companies is to co-opt social /health causes for their own advantage. In 1992, the pink ribbon became the official symbol for breast cancer awareness. Since the adoption of the pink ribbon, the color pink has is often associated with support of breast cancer survivors, as well as women solidarity. By using the prink ribbon on their advertisements, many e-cig companies are attempting to earn goodwill from the public as well as suggest to potential consumers that there is nothing harmful about the product. For instance, an EverSmoke ad shows the torso of a woman with her breast covered by her hand and the pink breast cancer ribbon. The slogan reads “Save a Life. Save a Lung. Save a Boob.” At a time when no research had been done into the health effects of e-cigs this is a highly immoral advertising tactic, designed to play on people's fears of an often-fatal disease.

Light – img3073

by

The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Ultra Light – img3152

by

The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Ultra Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which is supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Sometimes referred to simply as “Ultra” cigarettes, Ultra Lights came into popularity in the early 1980s, and generally reported about half the tar and nicotine content of ordinary Light cigarettes. Many of the ads within this theme present ultra lights as carefree, However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes came in varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories that extended across cigarette brands.

Ultra Light cigarettes, like Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation: Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. A 2007 ad for Pall Mall, featured in this theme, reveals that the tobacco companies were prepared for this change: “BRIGHT NOW. Introducing Orange Box for Ultra Light.” The other designations and their corresponding pack colors are also featured so that consumers could figure out which color indicated which “health” designation for future purchases.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00

Low Tar – img3215

by

Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.

It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.

Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

Singers – img17054

by

In the 1920s, tobacco companies began enlisting hundreds of celebrities to endorse their products. In these advertisements, movie stars, famous singers, athletes, and even socialites graced the pages of popular magazines, editorials, and newspapers printed across the country. The 1920s and 1930s were the heyday of celebrity endorsement, with celebrities hawking everything from cigarettes to soap, from pantyhose to cars. However, it seems that no company was as prolific in its celebrity ad copy as Lucky Strike.

Singers were vital components of celebrity testimonial campaigns for cigarette companies; the emphasis on healthy, clear voices in the singers’ line of work was an ideal avenue for portraying cigarettes as healthful, rather than harmful. The concept was that if a famous singer entrusted her voice and throat – her source of revenue – to a cigarette brand, then it must not be so bad! “If it’s good enough for Frank Sinatra, it’s good enough for me,” a consumer might decide. It is ironic, of course, that these ads also worked to reveal the possible side effects of smoking by providing a problem (irritated throats, for example) and a solution (smoke our brand.) Still, this “problem-solution” advertising was very popular at the time, and worked to position one brand as the exception to the problem rule or as the least problematic of all cigarette brands. It also served to trivialize health side effects of smoking, masking more serious side effects in the process.

Stars were also used to attract a younger crowd. Stars were glamorous and represented a walk of life attractive to consumers who were already invested in tabloids and the lives of the show business elite. It wasn’t until 1964 that tobacco companies were banned from using testimonials from athletes, entertainers, and other famous personalities who might be appealing to consumers under 21 years of age.

Ultra Light – img3153

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The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Ultra Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which is supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Sometimes referred to simply as “Ultra” cigarettes, Ultra Lights came into popularity in the early 1980s, and generally reported about half the tar and nicotine content of ordinary Light cigarettes. Many of the ads within this theme present ultra lights as carefree, However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.

“Light” cigarettes came in varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories that extended across cigarette brands.

Ultra Light cigarettes, like Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation: Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. A 2007 ad for Pall Mall, featured in this theme, reveals that the tobacco companies were prepared for this change: “BRIGHT NOW. Introducing Orange Box for Ultra Light.” The other designations and their corresponding pack colors are also featured so that consumers could figure out which color indicated which “health” designation for future purchases.

1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00