Tobacco companies often solicited endorsements from athletes to emphasize healthy, active lifestyles and tie these lifestyles in with their cigarettes. Additionally, well-known athletes could give the same kind of celebrity appeal as singers and actors, especially for teens and young adults. Sometimes, tobacco companies showed every-day people playing sports to create a connection among health, energy, athleticism, and cigarettes. Female athletes were highlighted as early as the 1920s (in this collection, a 1927 advertisement from Lucky Strike features a woman playing tennis with a man). Many of the female athletes who were selected to endorse cigarette brands played sports that could be considered feminine: tennis and table tennis, ice skating, swimming and diving, golf, and skiing. Some of the modern ads feature women playing more “manly” sports, like basketball or football, with their boyfriends, or show a woman playing billiards in an attempt to entice young men to the brand.
Low Tar
Women in Sports – img7317
Vantage – img9618
Capri – img9931
Brown & Williamson launched Capri as the first ever “super slim” cigarette in 1987, targeting young women. Traditional cigarettes have a circumference of 25 mm, slim cigarettes 23 mm, and Capri Super Slims only 17 mm. Advertisements for Capri follow the logic that slimmer is better, apparently influenced by the assumption that women prefer to be physically slim, since a slender figure is often presented as more desirable in women’s fashion magazines and by models in the fashion industry. Slogans such as “The slimmest slim in town” (1988) and “There is no slimmer way to smoke” (1994) provides a not-so-subliminal message that by smoking Capri cigarettes, consumers can count on obtaining or maintaining a slimmer figure than everyone else.
Artist at Work – img13359
Artist at Work – img13360
Classical Music – img13312
True – img9592
Protects Your Health – img1939
This theme features a variety of ads professing health benefits for filter cigarettes, although filters did little to truly reduce the hazards of smoking. Indeed, tobacco industry chemists were well aware that most filters actually removed no more tar and nicotine than would the same length of tobacco. However, a series of Reader’s Digest articles worked to publicize these dubious health claims for filters in the 1950s.
One such article, entitled “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” (1950), notes that artificial filters “take out some nicotine” since people are “aware that nicotine is a killer” (1). The article states that silica-gel cartridges remove 60% of nicotine from cigarettes. This article spurred Viceroy to print advertisements a week later which read, “Reader's Digest tells why filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health.” These health claims sparked a boom in Viceroy cigarette sales as well as an onslaught of new filter cigarette brands flooding the market. Kent was introduced in 1952 with a filter made of treated asbestos on crepe paper. In 1953, L&M followed with a “miracle tip” and Philip Morris advertised its di-ethylene glycol (Di-Gl) filter cigarette as “the cigarette that takes the FEAR out of smoking.” In the next two years, Marlboro was re-released as a filter cigarette which targeted men (it had previously been a cigarette targeting women, with a “beauty tip to protect the lips”), and Winston was introduced with a hefty advertising budget of $15 million.
Leading the pack with health claims was Kent, with ads that read, “What a wonderful feeling to know that Kent filters best of all leading filter cigarettes!” (1958) and “You’ll feel better about smoking with the taste of Kent!” (1961). Ironically, Kent’s filter contained asbestos, a mineral known to cause mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. In fact, the asbestos in Kent’s filter was crocidolite asbestos (also known as blue asbestos), which is often considered the deadliest form of the fibrous mineral.
1. Riis, R.W. Reader’s Digest. “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” 7 Jan 1999.
Low Tar – img3214
Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.
It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.
Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
Protects Your Health – img1940
This theme features a variety of ads professing health benefits for filter cigarettes, although filters did little to truly reduce the hazards of smoking. Indeed, tobacco industry chemists were well aware that most filters actually removed no more tar and nicotine than would the same length of tobacco. However, a series of Reader’s Digest articles worked to publicize these dubious health claims for filters in the 1950s.
One such article, entitled “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” (1950), notes that artificial filters “take out some nicotine” since people are “aware that nicotine is a killer” (1). The article states that silica-gel cartridges remove 60% of nicotine from cigarettes. This article spurred Viceroy to print advertisements a week later which read, “Reader's Digest tells why filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health.” These health claims sparked a boom in Viceroy cigarette sales as well as an onslaught of new filter cigarette brands flooding the market. Kent was introduced in 1952 with a filter made of treated asbestos on crepe paper. In 1953, L&M followed with a “miracle tip” and Philip Morris advertised its di-ethylene glycol (Di-Gl) filter cigarette as “the cigarette that takes the FEAR out of smoking.” In the next two years, Marlboro was re-released as a filter cigarette which targeted men (it had previously been a cigarette targeting women, with a “beauty tip to protect the lips”), and Winston was introduced with a hefty advertising budget of $15 million.
Leading the pack with health claims was Kent, with ads that read, “What a wonderful feeling to know that Kent filters best of all leading filter cigarettes!” (1958) and “You’ll feel better about smoking with the taste of Kent!” (1961). Ironically, Kent’s filter contained asbestos, a mineral known to cause mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. In fact, the asbestos in Kent’s filter was crocidolite asbestos (also known as blue asbestos), which is often considered the deadliest form of the fibrous mineral.
1. Riis, R.W. Reader’s Digest. “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” 7 Jan 1999.
Capri – img9937
Brown & Williamson launched Capri as the first ever “super slim” cigarette in 1987, targeting young women. Traditional cigarettes have a circumference of 25 mm, slim cigarettes 23 mm, and Capri Super Slims only 17 mm. Advertisements for Capri follow the logic that slimmer is better, apparently influenced by the assumption that women prefer to be physically slim, since a slender figure is often presented as more desirable in women’s fashion magazines and by models in the fashion industry. Slogans such as “The slimmest slim in town” (1988) and “There is no slimmer way to smoke” (1994) provides a not-so-subliminal message that by smoking Capri cigarettes, consumers can count on obtaining or maintaining a slimmer figure than everyone else.
Low Tar – img3216
Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.
It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.
Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
Protects Your Health – img1941
This theme features a variety of ads professing health benefits for filter cigarettes, although filters did little to truly reduce the hazards of smoking. Indeed, tobacco industry chemists were well aware that most filters actually removed no more tar and nicotine than would the same length of tobacco. However, a series of Reader’s Digest articles worked to publicize these dubious health claims for filters in the 1950s.
One such article, entitled “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” (1950), notes that artificial filters “take out some nicotine” since people are “aware that nicotine is a killer” (1). The article states that silica-gel cartridges remove 60% of nicotine from cigarettes. This article spurred Viceroy to print advertisements a week later which read, “Reader's Digest tells why filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health.” These health claims sparked a boom in Viceroy cigarette sales as well as an onslaught of new filter cigarette brands flooding the market. Kent was introduced in 1952 with a filter made of treated asbestos on crepe paper. In 1953, L&M followed with a “miracle tip” and Philip Morris advertised its di-ethylene glycol (Di-Gl) filter cigarette as “the cigarette that takes the FEAR out of smoking.” In the next two years, Marlboro was re-released as a filter cigarette which targeted men (it had previously been a cigarette targeting women, with a “beauty tip to protect the lips”), and Winston was introduced with a hefty advertising budget of $15 million.
Leading the pack with health claims was Kent, with ads that read, “What a wonderful feeling to know that Kent filters best of all leading filter cigarettes!” (1958) and “You’ll feel better about smoking with the taste of Kent!” (1961). Ironically, Kent’s filter contained asbestos, a mineral known to cause mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. In fact, the asbestos in Kent’s filter was crocidolite asbestos (also known as blue asbestos), which is often considered the deadliest form of the fibrous mineral.
1. Riis, R.W. Reader’s Digest. “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” 7 Jan 1999.
Low Tar – img3217
Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.
It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.
Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
Capri – img9938
Brown & Williamson launched Capri as the first ever “super slim” cigarette in 1987, targeting young women. Traditional cigarettes have a circumference of 25 mm, slim cigarettes 23 mm, and Capri Super Slims only 17 mm. Advertisements for Capri follow the logic that slimmer is better, apparently influenced by the assumption that women prefer to be physically slim, since a slender figure is often presented as more desirable in women’s fashion magazines and by models in the fashion industry. Slogans such as “The slimmest slim in town” (1988) and “There is no slimmer way to smoke” (1994) provides a not-so-subliminal message that by smoking Capri cigarettes, consumers can count on obtaining or maintaining a slimmer figure than everyone else.
Capri – img9939
Brown & Williamson launched Capri as the first ever “super slim” cigarette in 1987, targeting young women. Traditional cigarettes have a circumference of 25 mm, slim cigarettes 23 mm, and Capri Super Slims only 17 mm. Advertisements for Capri follow the logic that slimmer is better, apparently influenced by the assumption that women prefer to be physically slim, since a slender figure is often presented as more desirable in women’s fashion magazines and by models in the fashion industry. Slogans such as “The slimmest slim in town” (1988) and “There is no slimmer way to smoke” (1994) provides a not-so-subliminal message that by smoking Capri cigarettes, consumers can count on obtaining or maintaining a slimmer figure than everyone else.
Protects Your Health – img1942
This theme features a variety of ads professing health benefits for filter cigarettes, although filters did little to truly reduce the hazards of smoking. Indeed, tobacco industry chemists were well aware that most filters actually removed no more tar and nicotine than would the same length of tobacco. However, a series of Reader’s Digest articles worked to publicize these dubious health claims for filters in the 1950s.
One such article, entitled “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” (1950), notes that artificial filters “take out some nicotine” since people are “aware that nicotine is a killer” (1). The article states that silica-gel cartridges remove 60% of nicotine from cigarettes. This article spurred Viceroy to print advertisements a week later which read, “Reader's Digest tells why filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health.” These health claims sparked a boom in Viceroy cigarette sales as well as an onslaught of new filter cigarette brands flooding the market. Kent was introduced in 1952 with a filter made of treated asbestos on crepe paper. In 1953, L&M followed with a “miracle tip” and Philip Morris advertised its di-ethylene glycol (Di-Gl) filter cigarette as “the cigarette that takes the FEAR out of smoking.” In the next two years, Marlboro was re-released as a filter cigarette which targeted men (it had previously been a cigarette targeting women, with a “beauty tip to protect the lips”), and Winston was introduced with a hefty advertising budget of $15 million.
Leading the pack with health claims was Kent, with ads that read, “What a wonderful feeling to know that Kent filters best of all leading filter cigarettes!” (1958) and “You’ll feel better about smoking with the taste of Kent!” (1961). Ironically, Kent’s filter contained asbestos, a mineral known to cause mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. In fact, the asbestos in Kent’s filter was crocidolite asbestos (also known as blue asbestos), which is often considered the deadliest form of the fibrous mineral.
1. Riis, R.W. Reader’s Digest. “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” 7 Jan 1999.
Low Tar – img3218
Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.
It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.
Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
Kool Classics – img8843
When menthol cigarettes were first brought to market, they were advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough. However, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to increased efforts marketing its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool (1). Government surveys in 2011 revealed that menthol cigarettes dominate 30% of the overall market, and over 80% of black smokers prefer menthol as opposed to 22% of non-Hispanic white smokers (2).
Recent menthol ads are clearly marketed toward a younger, urban demographic. Many of the ads feature models of a variety of ethnicities, and African Americans are particularly targeted. Recent Salem ads from the 2000s feature the slogan, “Stir the senses,” and each ad depicts a model smoking in green, mentholated ecstasy. Other Salem ads from the 2000s reveal clear youth targeting through a risk-taking appeal. For example, one of the ads presents an “underground” party, another presents a couple with an intertwining, extreme tattoo, and a third presents a scantily clad woman riding on the back of a man’s motorcycle – all in urban settings.
Kool’s advertisements from 2005 used the slogan “Be True,” which urged consumers to not only be true to themselves, but also to be true and loyal to the brand. Accompanying the “Be True” slogan was a variety of phrases such as “Be Passionate,” “Be Original,” “Be Smooth,” and “Be Bold,” all of which appeal to adolescents and young adults trying to “find themselves” and develop a sense of self. The “Be True” ads largely feature musicians, ranging from guitar players to disc jockeys, and their ethnicities are also noticeably diverse. In our collection, Asians, African Americans, and Caucasians are all represented in the “Be True” ad campaign. Other Kool campaigns from the 2000s, like “House of Menthol,” are more transparently urban-oriented, featuring boom boxes, speaker systems, microphones, graffiti, or skyscrapers. A subset of these ads features the “Kool Mixx” which claims to “celebrate the soundtrack to the streets” through limited edition cigarette packs. Urban youth were clearly a priority.
1. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00
2. Wilson, Duff. “Advisory Panel urges F.D.A. to re-examine menthol in cigarettes.” The New York Times. 18 March 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/business/19tobacco.html
Low Tar – img3219
Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.
It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.
Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
Low Tar – img3220
Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.
It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.
Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
Low Tar – img3221
Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.
It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.
Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
Low Tar – img3222
Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.
It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.
Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
Doctors Hawk Cigarettes – img6753
In the first half of the 20th century, tobacco companies were forthright with their health claims, featuring doctors hawking cigarettes or cigars in many of their ads. Consumers who saw these ads were made to feel that they would be following the doctor’s orders to achieve health or fitness if they were to smoke the cigarettes advertised. Today, these nefarious health claims in tobacco ads are no longer so obvious; now, often words like “pleasure” or “alive” are keywords which indicate healthfulness. Doctors are no longer represented hawking cigarettes in ads, but the past audacity of tobacco companies is just as relevant in modern times.
At the time when many of these ads were printed, the public was worried about throat irritation due to smoking, and tobacco companies hoped that support from physicians would ease general concern. The none-too-subtle message was that if the throat doctor, with all of his expertise, recommended a particular brand, then it must be safe. Unlike with celebrity and athlete endorsers, the doctors depicted were almost never specific individuals, because physicians who engaged in advertising would risk losing their license. It was contrary to accepted medical ethics at the time for doctors to advertise, but that did not deter tobacco companies from hiring handsome talent, dressing them up to look like doctors, and printing their photographs alongside recommendations. These images always presented an idealized physician – wise, noble, and caring. This genre of ads regularly appeared in medical journals such as the Journal of the American Medical Association, an organization which for decades collaborated closely with the industry. The big push to document health hazards also did not appear until later.
In this theme, countless brands depict doctors hawking tobacco products in order to present the brand as healthful rather than harmful – An early Old Gold ad shows a doctor lighting a woman’s cigarette as a “prescription for pleasure” (1938), Viceroy depicts doctors recommending the Viceroy brand (1950, 1953), and countless depictions of doctors recommend Ricoro, Gerard, or other brands of cigars. It is ironic that in the process, they all manage to reveal the negative potential of tobacco by providing the consumer with the concept of an unhealthy cigarette or cigar in the first place.
Less Nicotine – img3190
Camel’s “28% Less Nicotine” campaign ran from 1940-1944, most predominantly in 1941 and 1942. The campaign claimed that Camels had “extra mildness, extra coolness, extra flavor“ as well as “extra freedom from nicotine in the smoke.” It was clear that Camel was tying nicotine content to mildness, and thereby healthfulness, but no direct health claims were made. Rather, it was implied that cigarettes containing less nicotine were inherently better for you than other cigarettes. Of course, it has since been proven that if a brand of cigarettes does indeed contain less nicotine, smokers will merely smoke more cigarettes in order to get the same nicotine “kick” they would normally receive, thereby negating any possible health benefits.
The ads in the “28% Less” campaign cite “independent scientific tests” as the source for their facts and figures. Along with the claim of 28% less nicotine, R.J. Reynolds also claimed Camels burned 25% slower “than the average of the 4 other largest-selling brands tested.” The other brands tested were Lucky Strike, Chesterfield, Philip Morris, and Old Gold. The scientific report, conducted by New York Testing Labs, Inc., can be found in the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives, and is documented specifically as a “report made for William Etsy & Company,” R.J. Reynolds’ advertisement agency (1). The experiment was clearly sponsored by R.J. Reynolds with the intent of promoting Camel cigarettes. Toward the end of the report, the figures in question are reported specifically to facilitate ad copy writing: “Camel % less than average of 4 other brands by – 28.1%” and “Camel cigarettes burned slower than the average of other brands by a percentage of 25.5.”
The scientific report discloses that its methods were experimental in nature, and, in fact, a subsequent follow-up report from 1942 demonstrates much different results, with Camel coming in at only 4.9% slower-burning and 11.9% less nicotine. Clearly, the methods used were not reliable. As we now know, because this experiment was conducted on a smoking machine, its results are inconsequential; smoking machines are incapable of mimicking the variety of smoking patterns and the “smoking topography” of human smokers.
Also of note, particularly relevant to one advertisement, is a photograph of two technicians operating the “standardized automatic smoking apparatus” used for the experiment. The first ad of this theme contains the photograph. It is indeed the same machine used from the experiment, as it accurately matches the diagram provided in the scientific report accessible through the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives (1). The inclusion of the photograph in the advertisements is a clear indicator that the tests were hardly “independent” in nature, and that they were indeed sponsored generously by William Etsy & Company, and thus by R.J. Reynolds.
NY Testing Laboratories, Prvitz GJ, Jack GB JR. “An Investigation of the Ultimate Components, Nicotine in Smoke, and Burning Time of 5 Popular Brands of Cigarettes.” 31 July 1940. RJ Reynolds. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zic19d00
True – img12483
True – img12484
Less Nicotine – img3191
Camel’s “28% Less Nicotine” campaign ran from 1940-1944, most predominantly in 1941 and 1942. The campaign claimed that Camels had “extra mildness, extra coolness, extra flavor“ as well as “extra freedom from nicotine in the smoke.” It was clear that Camel was tying nicotine content to mildness, and thereby healthfulness, but no direct health claims were made. Rather, it was implied that cigarettes containing less nicotine were inherently better for you than other cigarettes. Of course, it has since been proven that if a brand of cigarettes does indeed contain less nicotine, smokers will merely smoke more cigarettes in order to get the same nicotine “kick” they would normally receive, thereby negating any possible health benefits.
The ads in the “28% Less” campaign cite “independent scientific tests” as the source for their facts and figures. Along with the claim of 28% less nicotine, R.J. Reynolds also claimed Camels burned 25% slower “than the average of the 4 other largest-selling brands tested.” The other brands tested were Lucky Strike, Chesterfield, Philip Morris, and Old Gold. The scientific report, conducted by New York Testing Labs, Inc., can be found in the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives, and is documented specifically as a “report made for William Etsy & Company,” R.J. Reynolds’ advertisement agency (1). The experiment was clearly sponsored by R.J. Reynolds with the intent of promoting Camel cigarettes. Toward the end of the report, the figures in question are reported specifically to facilitate ad copy writing: “Camel % less than average of 4 other brands by – 28.1%” and “Camel cigarettes burned slower than the average of other brands by a percentage of 25.5.”
The scientific report discloses that its methods were experimental in nature, and, in fact, a subsequent follow-up report from 1942 demonstrates much different results, with Camel coming in at only 4.9% slower-burning and 11.9% less nicotine. Clearly, the methods used were not reliable. As we now know, because this experiment was conducted on a smoking machine, its results are inconsequential; smoking machines are incapable of mimicking the variety of smoking patterns and the “smoking topography” of human smokers.
Also of note, particularly relevant to one advertisement, is a photograph of two technicians operating the “standardized automatic smoking apparatus” used for the experiment. The first ad of this theme contains the photograph. It is indeed the same machine used from the experiment, as it accurately matches the diagram provided in the scientific report accessible through the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives (1). The inclusion of the photograph in the advertisements is a clear indicator that the tests were hardly “independent” in nature, and that they were indeed sponsored generously by William Etsy & Company, and thus by R.J. Reynolds.
NY Testing Laboratories, Prvitz GJ, Jack GB JR. “An Investigation of the Ultimate Components, Nicotine in Smoke, and Burning Time of 5 Popular Brands of Cigarettes.” 31 July 1940. RJ Reynolds. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zic19d00
Let's Smoke Girls – img0563
Before the First World War, smoking was associated with the “loose morals” of prostitutes and wayward women. Clever marketers managed to turn this around in the 1920s and 1930s, latching onto women’s liberation movements and transforming cigarettes into symbols of women’s independence. In 1929, as part of this effort, the American Tobacco Company organized marches of women carrying “Torches of Freedom” (i.e., cigarettes) down New York’s 5th Avenue to emphasize their emancipation. The tobacco industry also sponsored training sessions to teach women how to smoke, and competitions for most delicate smoker. Many of the advertisements targeting women throughout the decades have concentrated on women’s empowerment. Early examples include “I wish I were a man” so I could smoke (Velvet, 1912), while later examples like “You’ve come a long way baby” (Virginia Slims) were more clearly exploitive of the Women’s Liberation Movement. It is interesting to note that the Marlboro brand, famous for its macho “Marlboro Man,” was for decades a woman’s cigarette (“Mild as May” with “Ivory tips to protect the lips”) before it underwent an abrupt sex change in 1954. Only 5 percent of American women smoked in 1923 versus 12 percent in 1932 and 33 percent in 1965 (the peak year). Lung cancer was still a rare disease for women in the 1950s, though by the year 2000 it was killing nearly 70,000 women per year. Cancer of the lung surpassed breast cancer as the leading cause of cancer death among women in 1987.
True – img9595
True – img9596
Low Tar – img9579
Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.
It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.
Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
Merit – img9622
Merit – img9623
Domestic Life – img10902
Couples in Love – img0699
Love and cigarettes, marriage and cigarettes, sex and cigarettes? Nothing is off limits in these tobacco advertisements which feature couples in love. The advertisements work cigarettes into the everyday lives of couples, seemingly bringing couples closer together or enhancing their sexual connection. In the 1920s and 1930s, women were pictured as part of a couple so as to lessen the shock value of women smoking. However, as times changed and women smoking became widely acknowledged, men and women continued to show up together in cigarette advertisements in romantic scenarios. These advertisements were particularly effective at targeting women, capitalizing on the stereotypical female desire to find a husband or be taken care of by a man. Often, however, these ads were also effective for men, who would imagine, after seeing one of the ads, that a woman sensuously falls into a man’s arms with just the whiff of a cigarette or the mingling of fumes.
Protects Your Health – img1957
This theme features a variety of ads professing health benefits for filter cigarettes, although filters did little to truly reduce the hazards of smoking. Indeed, tobacco industry chemists were well aware that most filters actually removed no more tar and nicotine than would the same length of tobacco. However, a series of Reader’s Digest articles worked to publicize these dubious health claims for filters in the 1950s.
One such article, entitled “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” (1950), notes that artificial filters “take out some nicotine” since people are “aware that nicotine is a killer” (1). The article states that silica-gel cartridges remove 60% of nicotine from cigarettes. This article spurred Viceroy to print advertisements a week later which read, “Reader's Digest tells why filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health.” These health claims sparked a boom in Viceroy cigarette sales as well as an onslaught of new filter cigarette brands flooding the market. Kent was introduced in 1952 with a filter made of treated asbestos on crepe paper. In 1953, L&M followed with a “miracle tip” and Philip Morris advertised its di-ethylene glycol (Di-Gl) filter cigarette as “the cigarette that takes the FEAR out of smoking.” In the next two years, Marlboro was re-released as a filter cigarette which targeted men (it had previously been a cigarette targeting women, with a “beauty tip to protect the lips”), and Winston was introduced with a hefty advertising budget of $15 million.
Leading the pack with health claims was Kent, with ads that read, “What a wonderful feeling to know that Kent filters best of all leading filter cigarettes!” (1958) and “You’ll feel better about smoking with the taste of Kent!” (1961). Ironically, Kent’s filter contained asbestos, a mineral known to cause mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. In fact, the asbestos in Kent’s filter was crocidolite asbestos (also known as blue asbestos), which is often considered the deadliest form of the fibrous mineral.
1. Riis, R.W. Reader’s Digest. “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” 7 Jan 1999.
Let's Smoke Girls – img0573
Before the First World War, smoking was associated with the “loose morals” of prostitutes and wayward women. Clever marketers managed to turn this around in the 1920s and 1930s, latching onto women’s liberation movements and transforming cigarettes into symbols of women’s independence. In 1929, as part of this effort, the American Tobacco Company organized marches of women carrying “Torches of Freedom” (i.e., cigarettes) down New York’s 5th Avenue to emphasize their emancipation. The tobacco industry also sponsored training sessions to teach women how to smoke, and competitions for most delicate smoker. Many of the advertisements targeting women throughout the decades have concentrated on women’s empowerment. Early examples include “I wish I were a man” so I could smoke (Velvet, 1912), while later examples like “You’ve come a long way baby” (Virginia Slims) were more clearly exploitive of the Women’s Liberation Movement. It is interesting to note that the Marlboro brand, famous for its macho “Marlboro Man,” was for decades a woman’s cigarette (“Mild as May” with “Ivory tips to protect the lips”) before it underwent an abrupt sex change in 1954. Only 5 percent of American women smoked in 1923 versus 12 percent in 1932 and 33 percent in 1965 (the peak year). Lung cancer was still a rare disease for women in the 1950s, though by the year 2000 it was killing nearly 70,000 women per year. Cancer of the lung surpassed breast cancer as the leading cause of cancer death among women in 1987.
Ultra Light – img3176
The ads in this theme outline the deceptive advertisement campaigns for “Ultra Light” cigarettes, a sub-category of so-called “light” cigarettes which is supposed to contain even less tar and nicotine. Sometimes referred to simply as “Ultra” cigarettes, Ultra Lights came into popularity in the early 1980s, and generally reported about half the tar and nicotine content of ordinary Light cigarettes. Many of the ads within this theme present ultra lights as carefree, However, the FDA has determined that all categories of previously-deemed “Light” cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors.
“Light” cigarettes came in varying degrees of reported “tar” delivery levels. According to a Philip Morris Inter-office memo from 1987, those cigarettes which have tar delivery levels of less than 14 mg are considered “Light” and those with levels under 6 mg are considered “Ultra Light” (1). These designations were generic categories that extended across cigarette brands.
Ultra Light cigarettes, like Lights, are no safer than other cigarettes, but have been misleadingly portrayed as such by tobacco companies. Since the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, it has begun to crack down on these designations, banning tobacco companies from using words such as “mild,” “low,” or “light” as of July, 2010. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation: Now, they rely on color-coding: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. A 2007 ad for Pall Mall, featured in this theme, reveals that the tobacco companies were prepared for this change: “BRIGHT NOW. Introducing Orange Box for Ultra Light.” The other designations and their corresponding pack colors are also featured so that consumers could figure out which color indicated which “health” designation for future purchases.
1. Weintraub, Jeff. “Identification Based on ‘Tar’ Deliveries.’ 9 Nov 1987. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jcj16e00
Mild as May – img9588
Tobacco companies have been advertising their particular brands as “mild” since the first half of the 20th century. From the start, smokers were aware that smoking irritated the throat, causing discomfort or “smoker’s hack.” Though serious health effects of smoking, like lung cancer, emphysema, and heart attack, were not yet identified in the first half of the 20th century, the seemingly benign side effects such as sore throat and cough were certainly bothersome to smokers. To counteract the sentiment that certain cigarettes were “harsh” and thereby worse for one’s health, cigarette companies began touting “mildness,” a ploy that has lasted well into the 21st century. By reassuring smokers that a particular brand was “mild,” tobacco companies succeeded in hooking consumers and preventing them from quitting.
In the 1930s, Philip Morris used “mildness” in an attempt to attract women, classifying Marlboros as “Mild as May.” Similarly, the American Tobacco Company, always struggling to maintain Lucky Strike’s female consumer base due to the brand’s inherently unfashionable packaging, employed the slogan, “Mildness and Character” along with images of beautiful, sophisticated, rich women. But a cigarette advertised as “mild” was by no means restricted to a female audience. Indeed, in the 1940s and ‘50s, Liggett & Myers drove home the “mildness” message in many of its Chesterfield ads that featured males. A good portion of these Chesterfield ads even included celebrity endorsements from famous men, including Ronald Reagan.
The deception continued and became increasingly prevalent as low-tar and low-nicotine cigarettes gained ground in the 1970s. At this time, Brown & Williamson released Kool Milds in an attempt to attract the health-conscious smoker. B&W continued advertising Kool Milds heavily until 2010, when FDA regulations prohibited tobacco companies from using misleading monikers such as “low” and “mild.” Since this new regulation, Kool has followed other brands in color-coding its cigarettes to indicate “mild” or “low-tar.” It has now repositioned Kool Milds as Kool Blue.
Mild as May – img9589
Tobacco companies have been advertising their particular brands as “mild” since the first half of the 20th century. From the start, smokers were aware that smoking irritated the throat, causing discomfort or “smoker’s hack.” Though serious health effects of smoking, like lung cancer, emphysema, and heart attack, were not yet identified in the first half of the 20th century, the seemingly benign side effects such as sore throat and cough were certainly bothersome to smokers. To counteract the sentiment that certain cigarettes were “harsh” and thereby worse for one’s health, cigarette companies began touting “mildness,” a ploy that has lasted well into the 21st century. By reassuring smokers that a particular brand was “mild,” tobacco companies succeeded in hooking consumers and preventing them from quitting.
In the 1930s, Philip Morris used “mildness” in an attempt to attract women, classifying Marlboros as “Mild as May.” Similarly, the American Tobacco Company, always struggling to maintain Lucky Strike’s female consumer base due to the brand’s inherently unfashionable packaging, employed the slogan, “Mildness and Character” along with images of beautiful, sophisticated, rich women. But a cigarette advertised as “mild” was by no means restricted to a female audience. Indeed, in the 1940s and ‘50s, Liggett & Myers drove home the “mildness” message in many of its Chesterfield ads that featured males. A good portion of these Chesterfield ads even included celebrity endorsements from famous men, including Ronald Reagan.
The deception continued and became increasingly prevalent as low-tar and low-nicotine cigarettes gained ground in the 1970s. At this time, Brown & Williamson released Kool Milds in an attempt to attract the health-conscious smoker. B&W continued advertising Kool Milds heavily until 2010, when FDA regulations prohibited tobacco companies from using misleading monikers such as “low” and “mild.” Since this new regulation, Kool has followed other brands in color-coding its cigarettes to indicate “mild” or “low-tar.” It has now repositioned Kool Milds as Kool Blue.
Other Menthol Classics – img8078
When menthol cigarettes were first brought to market, they were advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough. However, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to increased efforts marketing its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool (1). Government surveys in 2011 revealed that menthol cigarettes dominate 30% of the overall market, and over 80% of black smokers prefer menthol as opposed to 22% of non-Hispanic white smokers (2).
Recent menthol ads are clearly marketed toward a younger, urban demographic. Many of the ads feature models of a variety of ethnicities, and African Americans are particularly targeted. Recent Salem ads from the 2000s feature the slogan, “Stir the senses,” and each ad depicts a model smoking in green, mentholated ecstasy. Other Salem ads from the 2000s reveal clear youth targeting through a risk-taking appeal. For example, one of the ads presents an “underground” party, another presents a couple with an intertwining, extreme tattoo, and a third presents a scantily clad woman riding on the back of a man’s motorcycle – all in urban settings.
Kool’s advertisements from 2005 used the slogan “Be True,” which urged consumers to not only be true to themselves, but also to be true and loyal to the brand. Accompanying the “Be True” slogan was a variety of phrases such as “Be Passionate,” “Be Original,” “Be Smooth,” and “Be Bold,” all of which appeal to adolescents and young adults trying to “find themselves” and develop a sense of self. The “Be True” ads largely feature musicians, ranging from guitar players to disc jockeys, and their ethnicities are also noticeably diverse. In our collection, Asians, African Americans, and Caucasians are all represented in the “Be True” ad campaign. Other Kool campaigns from the 2000s, like “House of Menthol,” are more transparently urban-oriented, featuring boom boxes, speaker systems, microphones, graffiti, or skyscrapers. A subset of these ads features the “Kool Mixx” which claims to “celebrate the soundtrack to the streets” through limited edition cigarette packs. Urban youth were clearly a priority.
1. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00
2. Wilson, Duff. “Advisory Panel urges F.D.A. to re-examine menthol in cigarettes.” The New York Times. 18 March 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/business/19tobacco.html
True – img9601
Protects Your Health – img1964
This theme features a variety of ads professing health benefits for filter cigarettes, although filters did little to truly reduce the hazards of smoking. Indeed, tobacco industry chemists were well aware that most filters actually removed no more tar and nicotine than would the same length of tobacco. However, a series of Reader’s Digest articles worked to publicize these dubious health claims for filters in the 1950s.
One such article, entitled “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” (1950), notes that artificial filters “take out some nicotine” since people are “aware that nicotine is a killer” (1). The article states that silica-gel cartridges remove 60% of nicotine from cigarettes. This article spurred Viceroy to print advertisements a week later which read, “Reader's Digest tells why filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health.” These health claims sparked a boom in Viceroy cigarette sales as well as an onslaught of new filter cigarette brands flooding the market. Kent was introduced in 1952 with a filter made of treated asbestos on crepe paper. In 1953, L&M followed with a “miracle tip” and Philip Morris advertised its di-ethylene glycol (Di-Gl) filter cigarette as “the cigarette that takes the FEAR out of smoking.” In the next two years, Marlboro was re-released as a filter cigarette which targeted men (it had previously been a cigarette targeting women, with a “beauty tip to protect the lips”), and Winston was introduced with a hefty advertising budget of $15 million.
Leading the pack with health claims was Kent, with ads that read, “What a wonderful feeling to know that Kent filters best of all leading filter cigarettes!” (1958) and “You’ll feel better about smoking with the taste of Kent!” (1961). Ironically, Kent’s filter contained asbestos, a mineral known to cause mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. In fact, the asbestos in Kent’s filter was crocidolite asbestos (also known as blue asbestos), which is often considered the deadliest form of the fibrous mineral.
1. Riis, R.W. Reader’s Digest. “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” 7 Jan 1999.
True – img9602
True – img9603
Protects Your Health – img1965
This theme features a variety of ads professing health benefits for filter cigarettes, although filters did little to truly reduce the hazards of smoking. Indeed, tobacco industry chemists were well aware that most filters actually removed no more tar and nicotine than would the same length of tobacco. However, a series of Reader’s Digest articles worked to publicize these dubious health claims for filters in the 1950s.
One such article, entitled “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” (1950), notes that artificial filters “take out some nicotine” since people are “aware that nicotine is a killer” (1). The article states that silica-gel cartridges remove 60% of nicotine from cigarettes. This article spurred Viceroy to print advertisements a week later which read, “Reader's Digest tells why filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health.” These health claims sparked a boom in Viceroy cigarette sales as well as an onslaught of new filter cigarette brands flooding the market. Kent was introduced in 1952 with a filter made of treated asbestos on crepe paper. In 1953, L&M followed with a “miracle tip” and Philip Morris advertised its di-ethylene glycol (Di-Gl) filter cigarette as “the cigarette that takes the FEAR out of smoking.” In the next two years, Marlboro was re-released as a filter cigarette which targeted men (it had previously been a cigarette targeting women, with a “beauty tip to protect the lips”), and Winston was introduced with a hefty advertising budget of $15 million.
Leading the pack with health claims was Kent, with ads that read, “What a wonderful feeling to know that Kent filters best of all leading filter cigarettes!” (1958) and “You’ll feel better about smoking with the taste of Kent!” (1961). Ironically, Kent’s filter contained asbestos, a mineral known to cause mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. In fact, the asbestos in Kent’s filter was crocidolite asbestos (also known as blue asbestos), which is often considered the deadliest form of the fibrous mineral.
1. Riis, R.W. Reader’s Digest. “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” 7 Jan 1999.
True – img9604
True – img9605
Protects Your Health – img1971
This theme features a variety of ads professing health benefits for filter cigarettes, although filters did little to truly reduce the hazards of smoking. Indeed, tobacco industry chemists were well aware that most filters actually removed no more tar and nicotine than would the same length of tobacco. However, a series of Reader’s Digest articles worked to publicize these dubious health claims for filters in the 1950s.
One such article, entitled “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” (1950), notes that artificial filters “take out some nicotine” since people are “aware that nicotine is a killer” (1). The article states that silica-gel cartridges remove 60% of nicotine from cigarettes. This article spurred Viceroy to print advertisements a week later which read, “Reader's Digest tells why filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health.” These health claims sparked a boom in Viceroy cigarette sales as well as an onslaught of new filter cigarette brands flooding the market. Kent was introduced in 1952 with a filter made of treated asbestos on crepe paper. In 1953, L&M followed with a “miracle tip” and Philip Morris advertised its di-ethylene glycol (Di-Gl) filter cigarette as “the cigarette that takes the FEAR out of smoking.” In the next two years, Marlboro was re-released as a filter cigarette which targeted men (it had previously been a cigarette targeting women, with a “beauty tip to protect the lips”), and Winston was introduced with a hefty advertising budget of $15 million.
Leading the pack with health claims was Kent, with ads that read, “What a wonderful feeling to know that Kent filters best of all leading filter cigarettes!” (1958) and “You’ll feel better about smoking with the taste of Kent!” (1961). Ironically, Kent’s filter contained asbestos, a mineral known to cause mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. In fact, the asbestos in Kent’s filter was crocidolite asbestos (also known as blue asbestos), which is often considered the deadliest form of the fibrous mineral.
1. Riis, R.W. Reader’s Digest. “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” 7 Jan 1999.
Capri – img1031
Brown & Williamson launched Capri as the first ever “super slim” cigarette in 1987, targeting young women. Traditional cigarettes have a circumference of 25 mm, slim cigarettes 23 mm, and Capri Super Slims only 17 mm. Advertisements for Capri follow the logic that slimmer is better, apparently influenced by the assumption that women prefer to be physically slim, since a slender figure is often presented as more desirable in women’s fashion magazines and by models in the fashion industry. Slogans such as “The slimmest slim in town” (1988) and “There is no slimmer way to smoke” (1994) provides a not-so-subliminal message that by smoking Capri cigarettes, consumers can count on obtaining or maintaining a slimmer figure than everyone else.
Light – img11609
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11617
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Early Black Ads – img12189
As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.
Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.
Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).
The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”
Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).
As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.
One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”
At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).
1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )
2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”
3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.
4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.
5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00
6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00
7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00
8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00
9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.
Light – img11618
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11619
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11620
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11621
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11622
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11623
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11624
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11625
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11626
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11627
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11628
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
You've Come A
Long Way, Baby – img0891
Virginia Slims is a cigarette brand developed by Philip Morris in 1968 and marketed exclusively to women. Its early advertising campaigns exploited civil rights movements of the ‘60s with the slogan, “You’ve come a long way, baby,” a slogan which has lasted into modern times. The brand’s advertising methods continue to present Virginia Slims as the choice for strong, independent, liberated women. The 1990s slogan “It’s a woman thing” and the slogan of the 2000s, “Find Your Voice,” both signify that empowerment and feminism remain key leveraging mechanisms for the brand. An ad from 1995, for example, features a man wearing an apron and preparing a meal in the kitchen as a woman hugs him, cigarette in hand; the text reads, “Equality comes with no apron strings attached.” Often, these ads distract from the position of power Big Tobacco itself holds over both sexes, by pitting women against society instead of against the tobacco industry.
Additionally, marketing for Virginia Slims harnesses the power of fashion. Many print advertisements portray women in fashion-forward outfits and make references to fashion: “I’m a skyhigh pair of platforms in a closet full of flats,” an ad from 2001 boasts. The cigarettes themselves are longer and narrower than average cigarettes, reflected by the name “Slims.” This adoption of the word “slim” and indeed, sometimes even “superslim,” is a clear reference to a woman’s figure. A slim, slender figure is often presented as more desirable in women’s fashion magazines and by models in the fashion industry. The Virginia Slims brand portrays a subliminal, indirect message that Virginia Slims cigarettes will result in its smokers obtaining or maintaining a slim figure.
Light – img11629
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11630
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11631
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11633
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full
Light – img11634
The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.
Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.
The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.
1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full