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Stanford Research into the Impact of Tobacco Advertising

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Pseudoscience – img1550

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In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Medical Authority – img1594

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In the first half of the twentieth century, tobacco companies wielded medical authority in their advertisements to attract customers and, later, to placate a worried public. In particular, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys.” For example, in an ad from 1943, Philip Morris offered “full reports in medical journals from men high in their profession” upon request, and claimed that there was “scientific proof” that their brand was “far less irritating” than other leading brands. At the time, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. Instead, the doctor was seen as the ultimate expert, and science was seen as the ultimate solution.

Sheep Dip – img13039

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In 1931, Lucky Strike experimented with a campaign which referenced “sheep dip” in an attempt to prove the superiority of the “toasting” process. The campaign purported that the toasting process removed “harsh irritant chemicals naturally present in every tobacco leaf,” which were then sent on to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, to manufacture sheep dip, a chemical substance used to rid sheep of scabies. Interestingly, the key ingredient used in tobacco sheep dip was simply nicotine, rather than the “black, bitingly harsh irritant chemicals” the ads claimed. The ads attempted to convince consumers that the chemicals are “out so they can’t be in,” faulty logic at best.

Lucky Strike cigarettes did provide the base for sheep dip, though the resulting ad campaign was deceptive and a bit difficult for the everyday American to understand. It is no surprise that the campaign was short-lived, with just a handful (around 10) sheep-dip ads printed in total. It is important to note that these Lucky Strike ads are deceptive in two key ways; First, the ads claim that the byproduct sold to sheep-dip manufacturers is “black, biting, harsh irritant chemicals,” when in fact the byproduct is simply nicotine, never mentioned by name in the ads. Second, the ads employ a logical fallacy: “They’re out– so they can’t be in!” Two options are provided – the chemicals are either “out” or “in” the cigarettes. Because the chemicals are seemingly “out” in the sheep dip, then they must not be “in” the cigarettes. Of course, this fallacy can be broken down by stating the obvious: some chemicals may be “out,” while others certainly remain “in.”

Because most consumers were unaware of what sheep dip was, Lucky Strike dedicated a portion of its radio broadcast time to explaining the process to city dwellers. One internal industry memo documents the scripts for all 13 recordings of the NBC Studios radio show “The Lucky Strike Program with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra” for the month of August in 1931 (1). Eight of the 13 recordings expound on the sheep dip campaign. The programming for Saturday, August 22, for example, described an East Coast man to whom many listeners could relate: “Frank Leslie, whose only knowledge of sheep concerns boiled mutton and lamb chops, hasn’t the slightest notion what we mean when we speak of ‘sheep dip.’ No doubt he thinks it’s some kind of gravy for roast spring lamb.” The radio host then explains how farmers use sheep dip to treat livestock, and how this benefits smokers of Lucky Strike cigarettes.

Also on file among the internal industry documents are letters which indicate that solely the nicotine byproduct of Lucky Strike cigarettes was used in the manufacture of sheep dip. Though the American Tobacco Company had been siphoning off nicotine to sheep-dip manufacturers since at least 1915 (2), correspondence between the Vice President of the Tobacco By-Products and Chemical Corporation of Louisville, Kentucky, and the Vice President of the American Tobacco Company reveals that the nicotine from Lucky Strike cigarettes, in particular, was indeed sold in 1931. The VP of the Chemical Corporation found “improvement in the recovery of Nicotine that has been driven off by your ‘Lucky Strike process,” reporting that the nicotine could dip 1,500,000 sheep (3), or alternatively treat 2,700,000 poultry or create 765,000 gallons of spray for fruit trees (4).

1. “The Lucky Strike Program, with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra.” American Tobacco. August 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cpx75f00

2. Ramsay, RA, United States Department of Agriculture. No Title. American Tobacco. 2 March 1915. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jix70a00

3. Robinson, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 7 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iix70a00

4. Robinosn, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 12 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kix70a00

Smoke Anywhere – img20834

by

Freedom is possibly America’s most treasured value. Protected in the “Bill of Rights,” it is a deeply held core belief that to many Americans was a birthright and to some a hard fought victory. Given its hold on the American psyche, it has been used as a powerful marketing tool to hawk products as diverse as airplane tickets for Southwest Airlines, which calls itself “A Symbol of Freedom,” to getting a good night’s sleep with Dacron pillows, which is “America’s Freedom Fabric,” to the freedom to discover the road ahead with Chevrolet’s “Find New Roads,” and the freedom to “Just Do it” with Nike products.

E-cigarette (e-cig) companies have jumped on the freedom bandwagon and promise many kinds of freedom to vapers. A key selling point touted by e-cig companies is that their products can be used in places where smoking of traditional cigarettes is banned, like bars, restaurants, on flights, and in entertainment and sporting venues. An ad for Vapestick shows a woman vaping her e-cig in bed. The slogan of the ad reads, “Looks, Feels, and Tastes like a Real Cigarette That You Can Smoke Anywhere!”. A Cannastick ad shows people enjoying a concert under the caption “The Freedom to Vape Anywhere.” An ad for Cigana has the image of an airplane and is accompanied by the following text, “Smoke without the smoke…. Smoke like no one is watching.” A Vega Vapor ad tells consumers that many “local establishments are vapor friendly.”

The Smoke Anywhere theme is also widely publicized on brand websites. For instance, Blu e-cigs, says on its website, “blu e-cigs® electronic cigarettes are not traditional cigarettes and do not burn tobacco, so they can be smoked in bars, restaurants, offices and other places where normal smoking bans are in effect.” Fin e-cigs on its website says the brand is for individuals “…who want the freedom to smoke in places where traditional cigarettes are not permitted.

While e-cigs offer many freedoms to its users, a freedom that it cannot offer but it often promises is the freedom to smoke anywhere. Despite ads, eg. Blu and Vapestick, that show individuals vape on airplanes, the US Department of Transportation has issued guidelines restricting the use of e-cigs on flights. More restaurants are also coming forward to ban vaping on their premises. For instance, fast food giant Taco Bell has banned vaping in its premises.

Pseudoscience – img1551

by

In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Factories, Labs, Machines – img1678

by

This theme refers to ads which show the testing labs and production factories for tobacco manufacturers. The 1930s and 1940s saw a huge dependence on modern technology in tobacco advertisements. Whereas some tobacco companies touted state of the art factories (and guided tours!), still others boasted superior laboratories. Emphasis on modern advancements and scientific discoveries appealed to an American public vested in modernity. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. By showing these facilities, the manufacturers sought to associate their brands with the technology as the most modern, clean, and healthful. Labs, in particular, appear to be in existence to ensure the quality and safety of a product and thus the health of the consumer. An increasing dependence on science and medicine in the advertising of cigarettes continued well into the 1950s.

Today, Big Tobacco takes the opposite approach. The tobacco industry wants consumers to believe that cigarettes just appear out of thin air – it doesn’t want consumers to realize how much goes into the production of cigarettes. No photographs of modern cigarette factories exist today. The Cigarette Citadels project at Stanford University is working to undo the industry’s deception by mapping cigarette factories using Google Maps. More information on the Cigarette Citadels project and a link to the project’s Google Map can be found here: http://tobaccoresearch.stanford.edu

Less Nicotine – img3178

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Camel’s “28% Less Nicotine” campaign ran from 1940-1944, most predominantly in 1941 and 1942. The campaign claimed that Camels had “extra mildness, extra coolness, extra flavor“ as well as “extra freedom from nicotine in the smoke.” It was clear that Camel was tying nicotine content to mildness, and thereby healthfulness, but no direct health claims were made. Rather, it was implied that cigarettes containing less nicotine were inherently better for you than other cigarettes. Of course, it has since been proven that if a brand of cigarettes does indeed contain less nicotine, smokers will merely smoke more cigarettes in order to get the same nicotine “kick” they would normally receive, thereby negating any possible health benefits.

The ads in the “28% Less” campaign cite “independent scientific tests” as the source for their facts and figures. Along with the claim of 28% less nicotine, R.J. Reynolds also claimed Camels burned 25% slower “than the average of the 4 other largest-selling brands tested.” The other brands tested were Lucky Strike, Chesterfield, Philip Morris, and Old Gold. The scientific report, conducted by New York Testing Labs, Inc., can be found in the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives, and is documented specifically as a “report made for William Etsy & Company,” R.J. Reynolds’ advertisement agency (1). The experiment was clearly sponsored by R.J. Reynolds with the intent of promoting Camel cigarettes. Toward the end of the report, the figures in question are reported specifically to facilitate ad copy writing: “Camel % less than average of 4 other brands by – 28.1%” and “Camel cigarettes burned slower than the average of other brands by a percentage of 25.5.”

The scientific report discloses that its methods were experimental in nature, and, in fact, a subsequent follow-up report from 1942 demonstrates much different results, with Camel coming in at only 4.9% slower-burning and 11.9% less nicotine. Clearly, the methods used were not reliable. As we now know, because this experiment was conducted on a smoking machine, its results are inconsequential; smoking machines are incapable of mimicking the variety of smoking patterns and the “smoking topography” of human smokers.

Also of note, particularly relevant to one advertisement, is a photograph of two technicians operating the “standardized automatic smoking apparatus” used for the experiment. The first ad of this theme contains the photograph. It is indeed the same machine used from the experiment, as it accurately matches the diagram provided in the scientific report accessible through the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives (1). The inclusion of the photograph in the advertisements is a clear indicator that the tests were hardly “independent” in nature, and that they were indeed sponsored generously by William Etsy & Company, and thus by R.J. Reynolds.

NY Testing Laboratories, Prvitz GJ, Jack GB JR. “An Investigation of the Ultimate Components, Nicotine in Smoke, and Burning Time of 5 Popular Brands of Cigarettes.” 31 July 1940. RJ Reynolds. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zic19d00

Sheep Dip – img13056

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In 1931, Lucky Strike experimented with a campaign which referenced “sheep dip” in an attempt to prove the superiority of the “toasting” process. The campaign purported that the toasting process removed “harsh irritant chemicals naturally present in every tobacco leaf,” which were then sent on to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, to manufacture sheep dip, a chemical substance used to rid sheep of scabies. Interestingly, the key ingredient used in tobacco sheep dip was simply nicotine, rather than the “black, bitingly harsh irritant chemicals” the ads claimed. The ads attempted to convince consumers that the chemicals are “out so they can’t be in,” faulty logic at best.

Lucky Strike cigarettes did provide the base for sheep dip, though the resulting ad campaign was deceptive and a bit difficult for the everyday American to understand. It is no surprise that the campaign was short-lived, with just a handful (around 10) sheep-dip ads printed in total. It is important to note that these Lucky Strike ads are deceptive in two key ways; First, the ads claim that the byproduct sold to sheep-dip manufacturers is “black, biting, harsh irritant chemicals,” when in fact the byproduct is simply nicotine, never mentioned by name in the ads. Second, the ads employ a logical fallacy: “They’re out– so they can’t be in!” Two options are provided – the chemicals are either “out” or “in” the cigarettes. Because the chemicals are seemingly “out” in the sheep dip, then they must not be “in” the cigarettes. Of course, this fallacy can be broken down by stating the obvious: some chemicals may be “out,” while others certainly remain “in.”

Because most consumers were unaware of what sheep dip was, Lucky Strike dedicated a portion of its radio broadcast time to explaining the process to city dwellers. One internal industry memo documents the scripts for all 13 recordings of the NBC Studios radio show “The Lucky Strike Program with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra” for the month of August in 1931 (1). Eight of the 13 recordings expound on the sheep dip campaign. The programming for Saturday, August 22, for example, described an East Coast man to whom many listeners could relate: “Frank Leslie, whose only knowledge of sheep concerns boiled mutton and lamb chops, hasn’t the slightest notion what we mean when we speak of ‘sheep dip.’ No doubt he thinks it’s some kind of gravy for roast spring lamb.” The radio host then explains how farmers use sheep dip to treat livestock, and how this benefits smokers of Lucky Strike cigarettes.

Also on file among the internal industry documents are letters which indicate that solely the nicotine byproduct of Lucky Strike cigarettes was used in the manufacture of sheep dip. Though the American Tobacco Company had been siphoning off nicotine to sheep-dip manufacturers since at least 1915 (2), correspondence between the Vice President of the Tobacco By-Products and Chemical Corporation of Louisville, Kentucky, and the Vice President of the American Tobacco Company reveals that the nicotine from Lucky Strike cigarettes, in particular, was indeed sold in 1931. The VP of the Chemical Corporation found “improvement in the recovery of Nicotine that has been driven off by your ‘Lucky Strike process,” reporting that the nicotine could dip 1,500,000 sheep (3), or alternatively treat 2,700,000 poultry or create 765,000 gallons of spray for fruit trees (4).

1. “The Lucky Strike Program, with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra.” American Tobacco. August 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cpx75f00

2. Ramsay, RA, United States Department of Agriculture. No Title. American Tobacco. 2 March 1915. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jix70a00

3. Robinson, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 7 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iix70a00

4. Robinosn, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 12 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kix70a00

Pseudoscience – img1552

by

In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Factories, Labs, Machines – img1679

by

This theme refers to ads which show the testing labs and production factories for tobacco manufacturers. The 1930s and 1940s saw a huge dependence on modern technology in tobacco advertisements. Whereas some tobacco companies touted state of the art factories (and guided tours!), still others boasted superior laboratories. Emphasis on modern advancements and scientific discoveries appealed to an American public vested in modernity. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. By showing these facilities, the manufacturers sought to associate their brands with the technology as the most modern, clean, and healthful. Labs, in particular, appear to be in existence to ensure the quality and safety of a product and thus the health of the consumer. An increasing dependence on science and medicine in the advertising of cigarettes continued well into the 1950s.

Today, Big Tobacco takes the opposite approach. The tobacco industry wants consumers to believe that cigarettes just appear out of thin air – it doesn’t want consumers to realize how much goes into the production of cigarettes. No photographs of modern cigarette factories exist today. The Cigarette Citadels project at Stanford University is working to undo the industry’s deception by mapping cigarette factories using Google Maps. More information on the Cigarette Citadels project and a link to the project’s Google Map can be found here: http://tobaccoresearch.stanford.edu

Medical Authority – img6782

by

In the first half of the twentieth century, tobacco companies wielded medical authority in their advertisements to attract customers and, later, to placate a worried public. In particular, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys.” For example, in an ad from 1943, Philip Morris offered “full reports in medical journals from men high in their profession” upon request, and claimed that there was “scientific proof” that their brand was “far less irritating” than other leading brands. At the time, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. Instead, the doctor was seen as the ultimate expert, and science was seen as the ultimate solution.

Sheep Dip – img13057

by

In 1931, Lucky Strike experimented with a campaign which referenced “sheep dip” in an attempt to prove the superiority of the “toasting” process. The campaign purported that the toasting process removed “harsh irritant chemicals naturally present in every tobacco leaf,” which were then sent on to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, to manufacture sheep dip, a chemical substance used to rid sheep of scabies. Interestingly, the key ingredient used in tobacco sheep dip was simply nicotine, rather than the “black, bitingly harsh irritant chemicals” the ads claimed. The ads attempted to convince consumers that the chemicals are “out so they can’t be in,” faulty logic at best.

Lucky Strike cigarettes did provide the base for sheep dip, though the resulting ad campaign was deceptive and a bit difficult for the everyday American to understand. It is no surprise that the campaign was short-lived, with just a handful (around 10) sheep-dip ads printed in total. It is important to note that these Lucky Strike ads are deceptive in two key ways; First, the ads claim that the byproduct sold to sheep-dip manufacturers is “black, biting, harsh irritant chemicals,” when in fact the byproduct is simply nicotine, never mentioned by name in the ads. Second, the ads employ a logical fallacy: “They’re out– so they can’t be in!” Two options are provided – the chemicals are either “out” or “in” the cigarettes. Because the chemicals are seemingly “out” in the sheep dip, then they must not be “in” the cigarettes. Of course, this fallacy can be broken down by stating the obvious: some chemicals may be “out,” while others certainly remain “in.”

Because most consumers were unaware of what sheep dip was, Lucky Strike dedicated a portion of its radio broadcast time to explaining the process to city dwellers. One internal industry memo documents the scripts for all 13 recordings of the NBC Studios radio show “The Lucky Strike Program with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra” for the month of August in 1931 (1). Eight of the 13 recordings expound on the sheep dip campaign. The programming for Saturday, August 22, for example, described an East Coast man to whom many listeners could relate: “Frank Leslie, whose only knowledge of sheep concerns boiled mutton and lamb chops, hasn’t the slightest notion what we mean when we speak of ‘sheep dip.’ No doubt he thinks it’s some kind of gravy for roast spring lamb.” The radio host then explains how farmers use sheep dip to treat livestock, and how this benefits smokers of Lucky Strike cigarettes.

Also on file among the internal industry documents are letters which indicate that solely the nicotine byproduct of Lucky Strike cigarettes was used in the manufacture of sheep dip. Though the American Tobacco Company had been siphoning off nicotine to sheep-dip manufacturers since at least 1915 (2), correspondence between the Vice President of the Tobacco By-Products and Chemical Corporation of Louisville, Kentucky, and the Vice President of the American Tobacco Company reveals that the nicotine from Lucky Strike cigarettes, in particular, was indeed sold in 1931. The VP of the Chemical Corporation found “improvement in the recovery of Nicotine that has been driven off by your ‘Lucky Strike process,” reporting that the nicotine could dip 1,500,000 sheep (3), or alternatively treat 2,700,000 poultry or create 765,000 gallons of spray for fruit trees (4).

1. “The Lucky Strike Program, with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra.” American Tobacco. August 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cpx75f00

2. Ramsay, RA, United States Department of Agriculture. No Title. American Tobacco. 2 March 1915. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jix70a00

3. Robinson, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 7 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iix70a00

4. Robinosn, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 12 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kix70a00

Medical Authority – img1596

by

In the first half of the twentieth century, tobacco companies wielded medical authority in their advertisements to attract customers and, later, to placate a worried public. In particular, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys.” For example, in an ad from 1943, Philip Morris offered “full reports in medical journals from men high in their profession” upon request, and claimed that there was “scientific proof” that their brand was “far less irritating” than other leading brands. At the time, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. Instead, the doctor was seen as the ultimate expert, and science was seen as the ultimate solution.

Factories, Labs, Machines – img1680

by

This theme refers to ads which show the testing labs and production factories for tobacco manufacturers. The 1930s and 1940s saw a huge dependence on modern technology in tobacco advertisements. Whereas some tobacco companies touted state of the art factories (and guided tours!), still others boasted superior laboratories. Emphasis on modern advancements and scientific discoveries appealed to an American public vested in modernity. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. By showing these facilities, the manufacturers sought to associate their brands with the technology as the most modern, clean, and healthful. Labs, in particular, appear to be in existence to ensure the quality and safety of a product and thus the health of the consumer. An increasing dependence on science and medicine in the advertising of cigarettes continued well into the 1950s.

Today, Big Tobacco takes the opposite approach. The tobacco industry wants consumers to believe that cigarettes just appear out of thin air – it doesn’t want consumers to realize how much goes into the production of cigarettes. No photographs of modern cigarette factories exist today. The Cigarette Citadels project at Stanford University is working to undo the industry’s deception by mapping cigarette factories using Google Maps. More information on the Cigarette Citadels project and a link to the project’s Google Map can be found here: http://tobaccoresearch.stanford.edu

Never a Rough Puff – img3285

by

Tobacco companies have been advertising their particular brands as “mild” since the first half of the 20th century. From the start, smokers were aware that smoking irritated the throat, causing discomfort or “smoker’s hack.” Though serious health effects of smoking, like lung cancer, emphysema, and heart attack, were not yet identified in the first half of the 20th century, the seemingly benign side effects such as sore throat and cough were certainly bothersome to smokers.

To counteract the sentiment that certain cigarettes were “harsh” and thereby worse for your health, cigarette companies began touting “mildness,” a ploy that has lasted well into the 21st century. By reassuring smokers that a particular brand was “mild,” tobacco companies succeeded in hooking consumers and preventing them from quitting.

After appealing to smokers’ desires for throat ease for years, the American Tobacco Company issued the penultimate mild campaign in 1950: “There’s never a rough puff in a Lucky.” The campaign included celebrity testimonials – an advertising technique Lucky Strike perfected – but also urged consumers to “let your own taste and throat be the judge.” Like many of Lucky’s advertisements at the time, this campaign claimed that Lucky Strikes were “free and easy on the draw,” clearly a synonym for mild.

Sheep Dip – img13058

by

In 1931, Lucky Strike experimented with a campaign which referenced “sheep dip” in an attempt to prove the superiority of the “toasting” process. The campaign purported that the toasting process removed “harsh irritant chemicals naturally present in every tobacco leaf,” which were then sent on to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, to manufacture sheep dip, a chemical substance used to rid sheep of scabies. Interestingly, the key ingredient used in tobacco sheep dip was simply nicotine, rather than the “black, bitingly harsh irritant chemicals” the ads claimed. The ads attempted to convince consumers that the chemicals are “out so they can’t be in,” faulty logic at best.

Lucky Strike cigarettes did provide the base for sheep dip, though the resulting ad campaign was deceptive and a bit difficult for the everyday American to understand. It is no surprise that the campaign was short-lived, with just a handful (around 10) sheep-dip ads printed in total. It is important to note that these Lucky Strike ads are deceptive in two key ways; First, the ads claim that the byproduct sold to sheep-dip manufacturers is “black, biting, harsh irritant chemicals,” when in fact the byproduct is simply nicotine, never mentioned by name in the ads. Second, the ads employ a logical fallacy: “They’re out– so they can’t be in!” Two options are provided – the chemicals are either “out” or “in” the cigarettes. Because the chemicals are seemingly “out” in the sheep dip, then they must not be “in” the cigarettes. Of course, this fallacy can be broken down by stating the obvious: some chemicals may be “out,” while others certainly remain “in.”

Because most consumers were unaware of what sheep dip was, Lucky Strike dedicated a portion of its radio broadcast time to explaining the process to city dwellers. One internal industry memo documents the scripts for all 13 recordings of the NBC Studios radio show “The Lucky Strike Program with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra” for the month of August in 1931 (1). Eight of the 13 recordings expound on the sheep dip campaign. The programming for Saturday, August 22, for example, described an East Coast man to whom many listeners could relate: “Frank Leslie, whose only knowledge of sheep concerns boiled mutton and lamb chops, hasn’t the slightest notion what we mean when we speak of ‘sheep dip.’ No doubt he thinks it’s some kind of gravy for roast spring lamb.” The radio host then explains how farmers use sheep dip to treat livestock, and how this benefits smokers of Lucky Strike cigarettes.

Also on file among the internal industry documents are letters which indicate that solely the nicotine byproduct of Lucky Strike cigarettes was used in the manufacture of sheep dip. Though the American Tobacco Company had been siphoning off nicotine to sheep-dip manufacturers since at least 1915 (2), correspondence between the Vice President of the Tobacco By-Products and Chemical Corporation of Louisville, Kentucky, and the Vice President of the American Tobacco Company reveals that the nicotine from Lucky Strike cigarettes, in particular, was indeed sold in 1931. The VP of the Chemical Corporation found “improvement in the recovery of Nicotine that has been driven off by your ‘Lucky Strike process,” reporting that the nicotine could dip 1,500,000 sheep (3), or alternatively treat 2,700,000 poultry or create 765,000 gallons of spray for fruit trees (4).

1. “The Lucky Strike Program, with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra.” American Tobacco. August 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cpx75f00

2. Ramsay, RA, United States Department of Agriculture. No Title. American Tobacco. 2 March 1915. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jix70a00

3. Robinson, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 7 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iix70a00

4. Robinosn, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 12 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kix70a00

Smoke Anywhere – img20835

by

Freedom is possibly America’s most treasured value. Protected in the “Bill of Rights,” it is a deeply held core belief that to many Americans was a birthright and to some a hard fought victory. Given its hold on the American psyche, it has been used as a powerful marketing tool to hawk products as diverse as airplane tickets for Southwest Airlines, which calls itself “A Symbol of Freedom,” to getting a good night’s sleep with Dacron pillows, which is “America’s Freedom Fabric,” to the freedom to discover the road ahead with Chevrolet’s “Find New Roads,” and the freedom to “Just Do it” with Nike products.

E-cigarette (e-cig) companies have jumped on the freedom bandwagon and promise many kinds of freedom to vapers. A key selling point touted by e-cig companies is that their products can be used in places where smoking of traditional cigarettes is banned, like bars, restaurants, on flights, and in entertainment and sporting venues. An ad for Vapestick shows a woman vaping her e-cig in bed. The slogan of the ad reads, “Looks, Feels, and Tastes like a Real Cigarette That You Can Smoke Anywhere!”. A Cannastick ad shows people enjoying a concert under the caption “The Freedom to Vape Anywhere.” An ad for Cigana has the image of an airplane and is accompanied by the following text, “Smoke without the smoke…. Smoke like no one is watching.” A Vega Vapor ad tells consumers that many “local establishments are vapor friendly.”

The Smoke Anywhere theme is also widely publicized on brand websites. For instance, Blu e-cigs, says on its website, “blu e-cigs® electronic cigarettes are not traditional cigarettes and do not burn tobacco, so they can be smoked in bars, restaurants, offices and other places where normal smoking bans are in effect.” Fin e-cigs on its website says the brand is for individuals “…who want the freedom to smoke in places where traditional cigarettes are not permitted.

While e-cigs offer many freedoms to its users, a freedom that it cannot offer but it often promises is the freedom to smoke anywhere. Despite ads, eg. Blu and Vapestick, that show individuals vape on airplanes, the US Department of Transportation has issued guidelines restricting the use of e-cigs on flights. More restaurants are also coming forward to ban vaping on their premises. For instance, fast food giant Taco Bell has banned vaping in its premises.