Children have played a huge role in tobacco advertising over the decades, and images of children fulfill multiple purposes for tobacco advertisers. Particularly in the Baby Boomer era, depictions of children with their mothers or fathers in cigarette ads reinforced the respectability of smoking as a part of normal family life, a perception often promulgated by the tobacco industry. Further, the images of youngsters tended to send a reassuring message to consumers about the healthfulness of the product, representing purity, vibrancy, and life – concepts which can be dangerous when tied to tobacco products. Finally, these depictions of children were an obvious ploy to attract females to smoking as part of the industry’s campaign to expand the pool of women smokers.
Navy
Less Nicotine – img3179
Camel’s “28% Less Nicotine” campaign ran from 1940-1944, most predominantly in 1941 and 1942. The campaign claimed that Camels had “extra mildness, extra coolness, extra flavor“ as well as “extra freedom from nicotine in the smoke.” It was clear that Camel was tying nicotine content to mildness, and thereby healthfulness, but no direct health claims were made. Rather, it was implied that cigarettes containing less nicotine were inherently better for you than other cigarettes. Of course, it has since been proven that if a brand of cigarettes does indeed contain less nicotine, smokers will merely smoke more cigarettes in order to get the same nicotine “kick” they would normally receive, thereby negating any possible health benefits.
The ads in the “28% Less” campaign cite “independent scientific tests” as the source for their facts and figures. Along with the claim of 28% less nicotine, R.J. Reynolds also claimed Camels burned 25% slower “than the average of the 4 other largest-selling brands tested.” The other brands tested were Lucky Strike, Chesterfield, Philip Morris, and Old Gold. The scientific report, conducted by New York Testing Labs, Inc., can be found in the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives, and is documented specifically as a “report made for William Etsy & Company,” R.J. Reynolds’ advertisement agency (1). The experiment was clearly sponsored by R.J. Reynolds with the intent of promoting Camel cigarettes. Toward the end of the report, the figures in question are reported specifically to facilitate ad copy writing: “Camel % less than average of 4 other brands by – 28.1%” and “Camel cigarettes burned slower than the average of other brands by a percentage of 25.5.”
The scientific report discloses that its methods were experimental in nature, and, in fact, a subsequent follow-up report from 1942 demonstrates much different results, with Camel coming in at only 4.9% slower-burning and 11.9% less nicotine. Clearly, the methods used were not reliable. As we now know, because this experiment was conducted on a smoking machine, its results are inconsequential; smoking machines are incapable of mimicking the variety of smoking patterns and the “smoking topography” of human smokers.
Also of note, particularly relevant to one advertisement, is a photograph of two technicians operating the “standardized automatic smoking apparatus” used for the experiment. The first ad of this theme contains the photograph. It is indeed the same machine used from the experiment, as it accurately matches the diagram provided in the scientific report accessible through the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives (1). The inclusion of the photograph in the advertisements is a clear indicator that the tests were hardly “independent” in nature, and that they were indeed sponsored generously by William Etsy & Company, and thus by R.J. Reynolds.
NY Testing Laboratories, Prvitz GJ, Jack GB JR. “An Investigation of the Ultimate Components, Nicotine in Smoke, and Burning Time of 5 Popular Brands of Cigarettes.” 31 July 1940. RJ Reynolds. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zic19d00
Less Nicotine – img3180
Camel’s “28% Less Nicotine” campaign ran from 1940-1944, most predominantly in 1941 and 1942. The campaign claimed that Camels had “extra mildness, extra coolness, extra flavor“ as well as “extra freedom from nicotine in the smoke.” It was clear that Camel was tying nicotine content to mildness, and thereby healthfulness, but no direct health claims were made. Rather, it was implied that cigarettes containing less nicotine were inherently better for you than other cigarettes. Of course, it has since been proven that if a brand of cigarettes does indeed contain less nicotine, smokers will merely smoke more cigarettes in order to get the same nicotine “kick” they would normally receive, thereby negating any possible health benefits.
The ads in the “28% Less” campaign cite “independent scientific tests” as the source for their facts and figures. Along with the claim of 28% less nicotine, R.J. Reynolds also claimed Camels burned 25% slower “than the average of the 4 other largest-selling brands tested.” The other brands tested were Lucky Strike, Chesterfield, Philip Morris, and Old Gold. The scientific report, conducted by New York Testing Labs, Inc., can be found in the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives, and is documented specifically as a “report made for William Etsy & Company,” R.J. Reynolds’ advertisement agency (1). The experiment was clearly sponsored by R.J. Reynolds with the intent of promoting Camel cigarettes. Toward the end of the report, the figures in question are reported specifically to facilitate ad copy writing: “Camel % less than average of 4 other brands by – 28.1%” and “Camel cigarettes burned slower than the average of other brands by a percentage of 25.5.”
The scientific report discloses that its methods were experimental in nature, and, in fact, a subsequent follow-up report from 1942 demonstrates much different results, with Camel coming in at only 4.9% slower-burning and 11.9% less nicotine. Clearly, the methods used were not reliable. As we now know, because this experiment was conducted on a smoking machine, its results are inconsequential; smoking machines are incapable of mimicking the variety of smoking patterns and the “smoking topography” of human smokers.
Also of note, particularly relevant to one advertisement, is a photograph of two technicians operating the “standardized automatic smoking apparatus” used for the experiment. The first ad of this theme contains the photograph. It is indeed the same machine used from the experiment, as it accurately matches the diagram provided in the scientific report accessible through the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives (1). The inclusion of the photograph in the advertisements is a clear indicator that the tests were hardly “independent” in nature, and that they were indeed sponsored generously by William Etsy & Company, and thus by R.J. Reynolds.
NY Testing Laboratories, Prvitz GJ, Jack GB JR. “An Investigation of the Ultimate Components, Nicotine in Smoke, and Burning Time of 5 Popular Brands of Cigarettes.” 31 July 1940. RJ Reynolds. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zic19d00
Kamel Modern – img5947
Marlboro has historically been the leading cigarette brand among youth, while Camel consistently pushes forward creative advertising concepts to gain youth market share from Marlboro and hook teens and young adults. The Red Kamel campaign of 1996 is just one of Camel’s many advertising techniques employed to target the previously uninitiated or new smoker. RJR’s “marketing objectives” with Red Kamel revolved around “adding new cutting edge associations to the Camel brand family” (1).
The Red Kamel brand slogan clearly targeted youth irreverence: “Back After 80 Years For No Good Reason Except They Taste Good” (2). The Kamel brand was first introduced in 1913 and existed until 1936 when R.J. Reynolds replaced it with today’s Camel brand. The limited time “reintroduction” of Red Kamel in 1996 provided a retro-vintage appeal to the brand, and RJR designed the ads to be “innovative—new and old at the same time” (3). An RJR spokesperson explained that the characters portrayed in Red Kamel ads were presented as “interesting, independent people,” indicating that “the type of person who smoked Kamels in the early 1900s would still smoke them today.” The Red Kamel campaign offered RJR a new youth marketing technique to replace the Old Joe Camel campaign which had just been “voluntarily” withdrawn.
One internal document explains that the brand positioning was “lust for living,” and that the product was meant to appear “lustier” as well as “rebellious, adventurous, authentic,” with a “hip, unexpected” style clearly targeting youth markets (4).
1. “Red Kamel & Kamel Menthe (Men-Th) Factbook.” 07 Jan 1999. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tqm72d00
2. “RJR Re-Establishes Red Kamel Brand February 1, 1996 (960201) Statement and Q&A for Response Only.” RJ Reynolds. 01 Feb 1996. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oml13d00
3. “Red Kamel Is Back!” Caravan. 08 Apr 1996. http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_s1/TI56580057.html
4. “1997 (19970000) Business Planning Meeting.” RJ Reynolds. 17 Sept 1996. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xyi72d00
Kamel Modern – img5951
Marlboro has historically been the leading cigarette brand among youth, while Camel consistently pushes forward creative advertising concepts to gain youth market share from Marlboro and hook teens and young adults. The Red Kamel campaign of 1996 is just one of Camel’s many advertising techniques employed to target the previously uninitiated or new smoker. RJR’s “marketing objectives” with Red Kamel revolved around “adding new cutting edge associations to the Camel brand family” (1).
The Red Kamel brand slogan clearly targeted youth irreverence: “Back After 80 Years For No Good Reason Except They Taste Good” (2). The Kamel brand was first introduced in 1913 and existed until 1936 when R.J. Reynolds replaced it with today’s Camel brand. The limited time “reintroduction” of Red Kamel in 1996 provided a retro-vintage appeal to the brand, and RJR designed the ads to be “innovative—new and old at the same time” (3). An RJR spokesperson explained that the characters portrayed in Red Kamel ads were presented as “interesting, independent people,” indicating that “the type of person who smoked Kamels in the early 1900s would still smoke them today.” The Red Kamel campaign offered RJR a new youth marketing technique to replace the Old Joe Camel campaign which had just been “voluntarily” withdrawn.
One internal document explains that the brand positioning was “lust for living,” and that the product was meant to appear “lustier” as well as “rebellious, adventurous, authentic,” with a “hip, unexpected” style clearly targeting youth markets (4).
1. “Red Kamel & Kamel Menthe (Men-Th) Factbook.” 07 Jan 1999. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tqm72d00
2. “RJR Re-Establishes Red Kamel Brand February 1, 1996 (960201) Statement and Q&A for Response Only.” RJ Reynolds. 01 Feb 1996. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oml13d00
3. “Red Kamel Is Back!” Caravan. 08 Apr 1996. http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_s1/TI56580057.html
4. “1997 (19970000) Business Planning Meeting.” RJ Reynolds. 17 Sept 1996. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xyi72d00
Politics & Law – img5261
Kamel Modern – img5969
Marlboro has historically been the leading cigarette brand among youth, while Camel consistently pushes forward creative advertising concepts to gain youth market share from Marlboro and hook teens and young adults. The Red Kamel campaign of 1996 is just one of Camel’s many advertising techniques employed to target the previously uninitiated or new smoker. RJR’s “marketing objectives” with Red Kamel revolved around “adding new cutting edge associations to the Camel brand family” (1).
The Red Kamel brand slogan clearly targeted youth irreverence: “Back After 80 Years For No Good Reason Except They Taste Good” (2). The Kamel brand was first introduced in 1913 and existed until 1936 when R.J. Reynolds replaced it with today’s Camel brand. The limited time “reintroduction” of Red Kamel in 1996 provided a retro-vintage appeal to the brand, and RJR designed the ads to be “innovative—new and old at the same time” (3). An RJR spokesperson explained that the characters portrayed in Red Kamel ads were presented as “interesting, independent people,” indicating that “the type of person who smoked Kamels in the early 1900s would still smoke them today.” The Red Kamel campaign offered RJR a new youth marketing technique to replace the Old Joe Camel campaign which had just been “voluntarily” withdrawn.
One internal document explains that the brand positioning was “lust for living,” and that the product was meant to appear “lustier” as well as “rebellious, adventurous, authentic,” with a “hip, unexpected” style clearly targeting youth markets (4).
1. “Red Kamel & Kamel Menthe (Men-Th) Factbook.” 07 Jan 1999. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tqm72d00
2. “RJR Re-Establishes Red Kamel Brand February 1, 1996 (960201) Statement and Q&A for Response Only.” RJ Reynolds. 01 Feb 1996. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oml13d00
3. “Red Kamel Is Back!” Caravan. 08 Apr 1996. http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_s1/TI56580057.html
4. “1997 (19970000) Business Planning Meeting.” RJ Reynolds. 17 Sept 1996. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xyi72d00
High Fashion – img0587
Throughout the decades, tobacco companies have capitalized on fashion, glamour and beauty to market their products to women. Most notably, in 1934, Lucky Strike staged a “Green Ball” at New York City’s Waldorf-Astoria, with every intention of making green, the then-color of a Lucky Strike pack, more fashionable for women so they would buy Luckies; fashion designers, reporters, socialites and many other influential people in the fashion world were in attendance at the Green Ball, while everyone thought some mysterious benefactor hosted the event. The 1920s saw the fashionable yet daring woman emerge in cigarette ads, while the 1930s saw a glamorous beauty, dripping in luxury. The Great Depression was the impetus for this latter type of woman, dressed in a ball gown, fur and gloves and jewels. The everyday woman could live vicariously, or might feel that she could adopt some of that luxury for herself by smoking the brand of cigarette advertised. Often, tobacco companies turned to chic celebrities to hawk their products, relying on their trendsetting ways to make the sell. Fashion trends change, but tobacco companies’ addiction to manipulating women through these trends has not changed. The models in Virginia Slims advertisements of the 1980s wore fashions which scream ‘80s, and the women in the ads of today can be seen in anything from trendy resort wear in a tropical setting to skin-revealing club wear. Whatever the case, tobacco companies know that if a woman sees a model in an ad who looks attractive, she will want to emulate her.
High Fashion – img0588
Throughout the decades, tobacco companies have capitalized on fashion, glamour and beauty to market their products to women. Most notably, in 1934, Lucky Strike staged a “Green Ball” at New York City’s Waldorf-Astoria, with every intention of making green, the then-color of a Lucky Strike pack, more fashionable for women so they would buy Luckies; fashion designers, reporters, socialites and many other influential people in the fashion world were in attendance at the Green Ball, while everyone thought some mysterious benefactor hosted the event. The 1920s saw the fashionable yet daring woman emerge in cigarette ads, while the 1930s saw a glamorous beauty, dripping in luxury. The Great Depression was the impetus for this latter type of woman, dressed in a ball gown, fur and gloves and jewels. The everyday woman could live vicariously, or might feel that she could adopt some of that luxury for herself by smoking the brand of cigarette advertised. Often, tobacco companies turned to chic celebrities to hawk their products, relying on their trendsetting ways to make the sell. Fashion trends change, but tobacco companies’ addiction to manipulating women through these trends has not changed. The models in Virginia Slims advertisements of the 1980s wore fashions which scream ‘80s, and the women in the ads of today can be seen in anything from trendy resort wear in a tropical setting to skin-revealing club wear. Whatever the case, tobacco companies know that if a woman sees a model in an ad who looks attractive, she will want to emulate her.
