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Sheep Dip – img13039

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In 1931, Lucky Strike experimented with a campaign which referenced “sheep dip” in an attempt to prove the superiority of the “toasting” process. The campaign purported that the toasting process removed “harsh irritant chemicals naturally present in every tobacco leaf,” which were then sent on to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, to manufacture sheep dip, a chemical substance used to rid sheep of scabies. Interestingly, the key ingredient used in tobacco sheep dip was simply nicotine, rather than the “black, bitingly harsh irritant chemicals” the ads claimed. The ads attempted to convince consumers that the chemicals are “out so they can’t be in,” faulty logic at best.

Lucky Strike cigarettes did provide the base for sheep dip, though the resulting ad campaign was deceptive and a bit difficult for the everyday American to understand. It is no surprise that the campaign was short-lived, with just a handful (around 10) sheep-dip ads printed in total. It is important to note that these Lucky Strike ads are deceptive in two key ways; First, the ads claim that the byproduct sold to sheep-dip manufacturers is “black, biting, harsh irritant chemicals,” when in fact the byproduct is simply nicotine, never mentioned by name in the ads. Second, the ads employ a logical fallacy: “They’re out– so they can’t be in!” Two options are provided – the chemicals are either “out” or “in” the cigarettes. Because the chemicals are seemingly “out” in the sheep dip, then they must not be “in” the cigarettes. Of course, this fallacy can be broken down by stating the obvious: some chemicals may be “out,” while others certainly remain “in.”

Because most consumers were unaware of what sheep dip was, Lucky Strike dedicated a portion of its radio broadcast time to explaining the process to city dwellers. One internal industry memo documents the scripts for all 13 recordings of the NBC Studios radio show “The Lucky Strike Program with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra” for the month of August in 1931 (1). Eight of the 13 recordings expound on the sheep dip campaign. The programming for Saturday, August 22, for example, described an East Coast man to whom many listeners could relate: “Frank Leslie, whose only knowledge of sheep concerns boiled mutton and lamb chops, hasn’t the slightest notion what we mean when we speak of ‘sheep dip.’ No doubt he thinks it’s some kind of gravy for roast spring lamb.” The radio host then explains how farmers use sheep dip to treat livestock, and how this benefits smokers of Lucky Strike cigarettes.

Also on file among the internal industry documents are letters which indicate that solely the nicotine byproduct of Lucky Strike cigarettes was used in the manufacture of sheep dip. Though the American Tobacco Company had been siphoning off nicotine to sheep-dip manufacturers since at least 1915 (2), correspondence between the Vice President of the Tobacco By-Products and Chemical Corporation of Louisville, Kentucky, and the Vice President of the American Tobacco Company reveals that the nicotine from Lucky Strike cigarettes, in particular, was indeed sold in 1931. The VP of the Chemical Corporation found “improvement in the recovery of Nicotine that has been driven off by your ‘Lucky Strike process,” reporting that the nicotine could dip 1,500,000 sheep (3), or alternatively treat 2,700,000 poultry or create 765,000 gallons of spray for fruit trees (4).

1. “The Lucky Strike Program, with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra.” American Tobacco. August 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cpx75f00

2. Ramsay, RA, United States Department of Agriculture. No Title. American Tobacco. 2 March 1915. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jix70a00

3. Robinson, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 7 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iix70a00

4. Robinosn, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 12 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kix70a00

Sheep Dip – img13056

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In 1931, Lucky Strike experimented with a campaign which referenced “sheep dip” in an attempt to prove the superiority of the “toasting” process. The campaign purported that the toasting process removed “harsh irritant chemicals naturally present in every tobacco leaf,” which were then sent on to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, to manufacture sheep dip, a chemical substance used to rid sheep of scabies. Interestingly, the key ingredient used in tobacco sheep dip was simply nicotine, rather than the “black, bitingly harsh irritant chemicals” the ads claimed. The ads attempted to convince consumers that the chemicals are “out so they can’t be in,” faulty logic at best.

Lucky Strike cigarettes did provide the base for sheep dip, though the resulting ad campaign was deceptive and a bit difficult for the everyday American to understand. It is no surprise that the campaign was short-lived, with just a handful (around 10) sheep-dip ads printed in total. It is important to note that these Lucky Strike ads are deceptive in two key ways; First, the ads claim that the byproduct sold to sheep-dip manufacturers is “black, biting, harsh irritant chemicals,” when in fact the byproduct is simply nicotine, never mentioned by name in the ads. Second, the ads employ a logical fallacy: “They’re out– so they can’t be in!” Two options are provided – the chemicals are either “out” or “in” the cigarettes. Because the chemicals are seemingly “out” in the sheep dip, then they must not be “in” the cigarettes. Of course, this fallacy can be broken down by stating the obvious: some chemicals may be “out,” while others certainly remain “in.”

Because most consumers were unaware of what sheep dip was, Lucky Strike dedicated a portion of its radio broadcast time to explaining the process to city dwellers. One internal industry memo documents the scripts for all 13 recordings of the NBC Studios radio show “The Lucky Strike Program with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra” for the month of August in 1931 (1). Eight of the 13 recordings expound on the sheep dip campaign. The programming for Saturday, August 22, for example, described an East Coast man to whom many listeners could relate: “Frank Leslie, whose only knowledge of sheep concerns boiled mutton and lamb chops, hasn’t the slightest notion what we mean when we speak of ‘sheep dip.’ No doubt he thinks it’s some kind of gravy for roast spring lamb.” The radio host then explains how farmers use sheep dip to treat livestock, and how this benefits smokers of Lucky Strike cigarettes.

Also on file among the internal industry documents are letters which indicate that solely the nicotine byproduct of Lucky Strike cigarettes was used in the manufacture of sheep dip. Though the American Tobacco Company had been siphoning off nicotine to sheep-dip manufacturers since at least 1915 (2), correspondence between the Vice President of the Tobacco By-Products and Chemical Corporation of Louisville, Kentucky, and the Vice President of the American Tobacco Company reveals that the nicotine from Lucky Strike cigarettes, in particular, was indeed sold in 1931. The VP of the Chemical Corporation found “improvement in the recovery of Nicotine that has been driven off by your ‘Lucky Strike process,” reporting that the nicotine could dip 1,500,000 sheep (3), or alternatively treat 2,700,000 poultry or create 765,000 gallons of spray for fruit trees (4).

1. “The Lucky Strike Program, with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra.” American Tobacco. August 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cpx75f00

2. Ramsay, RA, United States Department of Agriculture. No Title. American Tobacco. 2 March 1915. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jix70a00

3. Robinson, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 7 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iix70a00

4. Robinosn, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 12 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kix70a00

Sheep Dip – img13057

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In 1931, Lucky Strike experimented with a campaign which referenced “sheep dip” in an attempt to prove the superiority of the “toasting” process. The campaign purported that the toasting process removed “harsh irritant chemicals naturally present in every tobacco leaf,” which were then sent on to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, to manufacture sheep dip, a chemical substance used to rid sheep of scabies. Interestingly, the key ingredient used in tobacco sheep dip was simply nicotine, rather than the “black, bitingly harsh irritant chemicals” the ads claimed. The ads attempted to convince consumers that the chemicals are “out so they can’t be in,” faulty logic at best.

Lucky Strike cigarettes did provide the base for sheep dip, though the resulting ad campaign was deceptive and a bit difficult for the everyday American to understand. It is no surprise that the campaign was short-lived, with just a handful (around 10) sheep-dip ads printed in total. It is important to note that these Lucky Strike ads are deceptive in two key ways; First, the ads claim that the byproduct sold to sheep-dip manufacturers is “black, biting, harsh irritant chemicals,” when in fact the byproduct is simply nicotine, never mentioned by name in the ads. Second, the ads employ a logical fallacy: “They’re out– so they can’t be in!” Two options are provided – the chemicals are either “out” or “in” the cigarettes. Because the chemicals are seemingly “out” in the sheep dip, then they must not be “in” the cigarettes. Of course, this fallacy can be broken down by stating the obvious: some chemicals may be “out,” while others certainly remain “in.”

Because most consumers were unaware of what sheep dip was, Lucky Strike dedicated a portion of its radio broadcast time to explaining the process to city dwellers. One internal industry memo documents the scripts for all 13 recordings of the NBC Studios radio show “The Lucky Strike Program with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra” for the month of August in 1931 (1). Eight of the 13 recordings expound on the sheep dip campaign. The programming for Saturday, August 22, for example, described an East Coast man to whom many listeners could relate: “Frank Leslie, whose only knowledge of sheep concerns boiled mutton and lamb chops, hasn’t the slightest notion what we mean when we speak of ‘sheep dip.’ No doubt he thinks it’s some kind of gravy for roast spring lamb.” The radio host then explains how farmers use sheep dip to treat livestock, and how this benefits smokers of Lucky Strike cigarettes.

Also on file among the internal industry documents are letters which indicate that solely the nicotine byproduct of Lucky Strike cigarettes was used in the manufacture of sheep dip. Though the American Tobacco Company had been siphoning off nicotine to sheep-dip manufacturers since at least 1915 (2), correspondence between the Vice President of the Tobacco By-Products and Chemical Corporation of Louisville, Kentucky, and the Vice President of the American Tobacco Company reveals that the nicotine from Lucky Strike cigarettes, in particular, was indeed sold in 1931. The VP of the Chemical Corporation found “improvement in the recovery of Nicotine that has been driven off by your ‘Lucky Strike process,” reporting that the nicotine could dip 1,500,000 sheep (3), or alternatively treat 2,700,000 poultry or create 765,000 gallons of spray for fruit trees (4).

1. “The Lucky Strike Program, with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra.” American Tobacco. August 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cpx75f00

2. Ramsay, RA, United States Department of Agriculture. No Title. American Tobacco. 2 March 1915. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jix70a00

3. Robinson, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 7 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iix70a00

4. Robinosn, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 12 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kix70a00

Sheep Dip – img13058

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In 1931, Lucky Strike experimented with a campaign which referenced “sheep dip” in an attempt to prove the superiority of the “toasting” process. The campaign purported that the toasting process removed “harsh irritant chemicals naturally present in every tobacco leaf,” which were then sent on to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, to manufacture sheep dip, a chemical substance used to rid sheep of scabies. Interestingly, the key ingredient used in tobacco sheep dip was simply nicotine, rather than the “black, bitingly harsh irritant chemicals” the ads claimed. The ads attempted to convince consumers that the chemicals are “out so they can’t be in,” faulty logic at best.

Lucky Strike cigarettes did provide the base for sheep dip, though the resulting ad campaign was deceptive and a bit difficult for the everyday American to understand. It is no surprise that the campaign was short-lived, with just a handful (around 10) sheep-dip ads printed in total. It is important to note that these Lucky Strike ads are deceptive in two key ways; First, the ads claim that the byproduct sold to sheep-dip manufacturers is “black, biting, harsh irritant chemicals,” when in fact the byproduct is simply nicotine, never mentioned by name in the ads. Second, the ads employ a logical fallacy: “They’re out– so they can’t be in!” Two options are provided – the chemicals are either “out” or “in” the cigarettes. Because the chemicals are seemingly “out” in the sheep dip, then they must not be “in” the cigarettes. Of course, this fallacy can be broken down by stating the obvious: some chemicals may be “out,” while others certainly remain “in.”

Because most consumers were unaware of what sheep dip was, Lucky Strike dedicated a portion of its radio broadcast time to explaining the process to city dwellers. One internal industry memo documents the scripts for all 13 recordings of the NBC Studios radio show “The Lucky Strike Program with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra” for the month of August in 1931 (1). Eight of the 13 recordings expound on the sheep dip campaign. The programming for Saturday, August 22, for example, described an East Coast man to whom many listeners could relate: “Frank Leslie, whose only knowledge of sheep concerns boiled mutton and lamb chops, hasn’t the slightest notion what we mean when we speak of ‘sheep dip.’ No doubt he thinks it’s some kind of gravy for roast spring lamb.” The radio host then explains how farmers use sheep dip to treat livestock, and how this benefits smokers of Lucky Strike cigarettes.

Also on file among the internal industry documents are letters which indicate that solely the nicotine byproduct of Lucky Strike cigarettes was used in the manufacture of sheep dip. Though the American Tobacco Company had been siphoning off nicotine to sheep-dip manufacturers since at least 1915 (2), correspondence between the Vice President of the Tobacco By-Products and Chemical Corporation of Louisville, Kentucky, and the Vice President of the American Tobacco Company reveals that the nicotine from Lucky Strike cigarettes, in particular, was indeed sold in 1931. The VP of the Chemical Corporation found “improvement in the recovery of Nicotine that has been driven off by your ‘Lucky Strike process,” reporting that the nicotine could dip 1,500,000 sheep (3), or alternatively treat 2,700,000 poultry or create 765,000 gallons of spray for fruit trees (4).

1. “The Lucky Strike Program, with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra.” American Tobacco. August 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cpx75f00

2. Ramsay, RA, United States Department of Agriculture. No Title. American Tobacco. 2 March 1915. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jix70a00

3. Robinson, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 7 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iix70a00

4. Robinosn, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 12 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kix70a00

Sheep Dip – img13059

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In 1931, Lucky Strike experimented with a campaign which referenced “sheep dip” in an attempt to prove the superiority of the “toasting” process. The campaign purported that the toasting process removed “harsh irritant chemicals naturally present in every tobacco leaf,” which were then sent on to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, to manufacture sheep dip, a chemical substance used to rid sheep of scabies. Interestingly, the key ingredient used in tobacco sheep dip was simply nicotine, rather than the “black, bitingly harsh irritant chemicals” the ads claimed. The ads attempted to convince consumers that the chemicals are “out so they can’t be in,” faulty logic at best.

Lucky Strike cigarettes did provide the base for sheep dip, though the resulting ad campaign was deceptive and a bit difficult for the everyday American to understand. It is no surprise that the campaign was short-lived, with just a handful (around 10) sheep-dip ads printed in total. It is important to note that these Lucky Strike ads are deceptive in two key ways; First, the ads claim that the byproduct sold to sheep-dip manufacturers is “black, biting, harsh irritant chemicals,” when in fact the byproduct is simply nicotine, never mentioned by name in the ads. Second, the ads employ a logical fallacy: “They’re out– so they can’t be in!” Two options are provided – the chemicals are either “out” or “in” the cigarettes. Because the chemicals are seemingly “out” in the sheep dip, then they must not be “in” the cigarettes. Of course, this fallacy can be broken down by stating the obvious: some chemicals may be “out,” while others certainly remain “in.”

Because most consumers were unaware of what sheep dip was, Lucky Strike dedicated a portion of its radio broadcast time to explaining the process to city dwellers. One internal industry memo documents the scripts for all 13 recordings of the NBC Studios radio show “The Lucky Strike Program with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra” for the month of August in 1931 (1). Eight of the 13 recordings expound on the sheep dip campaign. The programming for Saturday, August 22, for example, described an East Coast man to whom many listeners could relate: “Frank Leslie, whose only knowledge of sheep concerns boiled mutton and lamb chops, hasn’t the slightest notion what we mean when we speak of ‘sheep dip.’ No doubt he thinks it’s some kind of gravy for roast spring lamb.” The radio host then explains how farmers use sheep dip to treat livestock, and how this benefits smokers of Lucky Strike cigarettes.

Also on file among the internal industry documents are letters which indicate that solely the nicotine byproduct of Lucky Strike cigarettes was used in the manufacture of sheep dip. Though the American Tobacco Company had been siphoning off nicotine to sheep-dip manufacturers since at least 1915 (2), correspondence between the Vice President of the Tobacco By-Products and Chemical Corporation of Louisville, Kentucky, and the Vice President of the American Tobacco Company reveals that the nicotine from Lucky Strike cigarettes, in particular, was indeed sold in 1931. The VP of the Chemical Corporation found “improvement in the recovery of Nicotine that has been driven off by your ‘Lucky Strike process,” reporting that the nicotine could dip 1,500,000 sheep (3), or alternatively treat 2,700,000 poultry or create 765,000 gallons of spray for fruit trees (4).

1. “The Lucky Strike Program, with B.A. Rolfe and his Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra.” American Tobacco. August 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cpx75f00

2. Ramsay, RA, United States Department of Agriculture. No Title. American Tobacco. 2 March 1915. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jix70a00

3. Robinson, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 7 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iix70a00

4. Robinosn, AG, Tobacco By-Products And Chemical Corporation. No Title. American Tobacco. 12 July 1931. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kix70a00

Less Nicotine – img3181

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Camel’s “28% Less Nicotine” campaign ran from 1940-1944, most predominantly in 1941 and 1942. The campaign claimed that Camels had “extra mildness, extra coolness, extra flavor“ as well as “extra freedom from nicotine in the smoke.” It was clear that Camel was tying nicotine content to mildness, and thereby healthfulness, but no direct health claims were made. Rather, it was implied that cigarettes containing less nicotine were inherently better for you than other cigarettes. Of course, it has since been proven that if a brand of cigarettes does indeed contain less nicotine, smokers will merely smoke more cigarettes in order to get the same nicotine “kick” they would normally receive, thereby negating any possible health benefits.

The ads in the “28% Less” campaign cite “independent scientific tests” as the source for their facts and figures. Along with the claim of 28% less nicotine, R.J. Reynolds also claimed Camels burned 25% slower “than the average of the 4 other largest-selling brands tested.” The other brands tested were Lucky Strike, Chesterfield, Philip Morris, and Old Gold. The scientific report, conducted by New York Testing Labs, Inc., can be found in the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives, and is documented specifically as a “report made for William Etsy & Company,” R.J. Reynolds’ advertisement agency (1). The experiment was clearly sponsored by R.J. Reynolds with the intent of promoting Camel cigarettes. Toward the end of the report, the figures in question are reported specifically to facilitate ad copy writing: “Camel % less than average of 4 other brands by – 28.1%” and “Camel cigarettes burned slower than the average of other brands by a percentage of 25.5.”

The scientific report discloses that its methods were experimental in nature, and, in fact, a subsequent follow-up report from 1942 demonstrates much different results, with Camel coming in at only 4.9% slower-burning and 11.9% less nicotine. Clearly, the methods used were not reliable. As we now know, because this experiment was conducted on a smoking machine, its results are inconsequential; smoking machines are incapable of mimicking the variety of smoking patterns and the “smoking topography” of human smokers.

Also of note, particularly relevant to one advertisement, is a photograph of two technicians operating the “standardized automatic smoking apparatus” used for the experiment. The first ad of this theme contains the photograph. It is indeed the same machine used from the experiment, as it accurately matches the diagram provided in the scientific report accessible through the UCSF Tobacco Legacy Archives (1). The inclusion of the photograph in the advertisements is a clear indicator that the tests were hardly “independent” in nature, and that they were indeed sponsored generously by William Etsy & Company, and thus by R.J. Reynolds.

NY Testing Laboratories, Prvitz GJ, Jack GB JR. “An Investigation of the Ultimate Components, Nicotine in Smoke, and Burning Time of 5 Popular Brands of Cigarettes.” 31 July 1940. RJ Reynolds. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zic19d00

Never a Rough Puff – img3287

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Tobacco companies have been advertising their particular brands as “mild” since the first half of the 20th century. From the start, smokers were aware that smoking irritated the throat, causing discomfort or “smoker’s hack.” Though serious health effects of smoking, like lung cancer, emphysema, and heart attack, were not yet identified in the first half of the 20th century, the seemingly benign side effects such as sore throat and cough were certainly bothersome to smokers.

To counteract the sentiment that certain cigarettes were “harsh” and thereby worse for your health, cigarette companies began touting “mildness,” a ploy that has lasted well into the 21st century. By reassuring smokers that a particular brand was “mild,” tobacco companies succeeded in hooking consumers and preventing them from quitting.

After appealing to smokers’ desires for throat ease for years, the American Tobacco Company issued the penultimate mild campaign in 1950: “There’s never a rough puff in a Lucky.” The campaign included celebrity testimonials – an advertising technique Lucky Strike perfected – but also urged consumers to “let your own taste and throat be the judge.” Like many of Lucky’s advertisements at the time, this campaign claimed that Lucky Strikes were “free and easy on the draw,” clearly a synonym for mild.

Gift for Daddy – img4390

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Depictions of children with their mothers or fathers in cigarette ads have the enormous ability to reinforce the respectability of smoking as a part of normal family life. Because this perception is often promulgated by the tobacco industry, it is no surprise that many tobacco advertisements took advantage of Father’s Day. Indeed, many print ads, particularly from the Baby Boomer era, depict children gifting cigarette cartons to their fathers. The images of youngsters worked to send a reassuring message to consumers about the healthfulness of the product, as youngsters represent purity, vibrancy, and life – concepts which can be dangerous when tied to tobacco products. An R.J. Reynolds ad from 1953, for example, depicts a woman and her two children ready to surprise Dad with Cavaliers. The accompanying text speaks directly to children, essentially selling the tobacco products to kids: “Make your Dad’s eyes light up…as he lights up his favorite smoke…with love from you to him on Father’s Day” 1953

Healthy Cigars and Pipes – img1510

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“Healthy” cigars and pipes were blatantly advertised well into the first half of the 20th century alongside their cigarette counterparts. Many of these advertisements claimed that if the consumer smoked the pipe or cigar in question, he would live longer or be healthier. A turn-of-the-century pipe, “the Harmless Smoker,” was advertised under the slogan, “Don’t Kill Yourself Smoking – Use the Harmless Smoker.” As late as 1931, Thompson’s Mell-O-Well Cigars claimed that physicians referred to their brand as “a health cigar.”

It is important to note that the tobacco smoke in pipes and cigars has a much higher alkalinity (with a pH of about 8.5) when compared to that of cigarettes (with a pH of about 5.3). The higher the smoke’s alkalinity, the more difficult it is for a smoker to inhale, as the smoke becomes too irritating, causing the lungs to reject the smoke. However, this does not mean that pipes or cigars are safe. In fact, studies have revealed a high rate of mouth cancer – especially cancer of the lip – associated with pipe smoking. Studies have also shown that cigars pose a higher amount of secondhand smoke exposure than cigarettes because they contain more tobacco that burns for a longer period of time. Today, hookah, a water pipe also known as shisha, is finding increasing popularity among youth as a “safe alternative” to smoking cigarettes – a misconception. Smoking hookah is strongly linked to oral and lung cancer, heart disease, and other tobacco-related illnesses, and studies have shown that more carbon monoxide is inhaled through hookah than through cigarettes.

Young Smokers – img3874

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The ads in this theme, featuring attractive, smiling, young models, blatantly target teens and young adults. This theme spans decades of cigarette ads targeting youth, from the 1920s Fatima cigarettes slogan, “the younger crowd,” to the 1930s and ’40s Old Gold slogan, “for young ideas,” to the 1950s Philip Morris slogan “for those with keen, young tastes.” Internal industry documents show that young people have been (and remain today) a key marketing target for tobacco companies.

Most smokers do not begin smoking as adults. Almost all new smokers, the lifeblood of the industry, are teens and young adults aged 13 to 21. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1973 reveals the long-seeded emphasis on targeting teens with cigarette ads: “Realistically, if our Company is to survive and prosper, over the long term, we must get our share of the youth market” (1). In the 1980s, R.J.R. placed a stronger emphasis on the necessity of hooking teens early, claiming that “younger adult smokers have been the critical factor in the growth and decline of every major brand and company over the last 50 years. They will continue to be just as important to brands/companies in the future…” (2). Later in this same document, the company literally refers to its smokers as if they assets, claiming that a young smoker “appreciates in value over time because of increased consumption.” Decades later, the sentiment that youth must be targeted remains prevalent. A more recent R.J. Reynolds document from 1998 explains that because only 31% of smokers begin smoking after age 18, and only 5% after age 24, “younger adults are the only source of replacement smokers” once adult smokers pass away (3).

The emphasis on targeting teens was by no means restricted to R.J. Reynolds. An internal Philip Morris document from 1981 explains that the teen market is “particularly important,” because “today’s teenager is tomorrow’s potential regular customer, and the overwhelming majority of smokers first begin to smoke while still in their teens” (4). Even after harsh criticism from activists and policy makers, tobacco companies continue to advertise to the youth market. While they claim they target only “informed adults” of at least 21 years, recent ad campaigns tell a different story. Take a look at some of our other themes, including “Flavored Tobacco,” “Joe Camel,” “Newport Teases Teens,” and “Recent Menthol” to discover Big Tobacco’s ongoing teen marketing campaigns.

Abroad, where regulation is less strict, flagrant targeting of youth in cigarette ads remains rampant. Bright pink ads for Kiss cigarettes in Russia, using fresh-faced girls enjoying lollipops and ice cream cones, exemplify the dangers of tobacco advertising with next to zero regulations.

1. Teague, Claude E. “Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth Market.” R.J. Reynolds. 2 Feb 1973. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mqu46b00/pdf

2. Burrows, D.S. “Younger Adult Smokers: Strategies and Opportunities.” R.J. Reynolds. 29 February 1984. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tqq46b00/pdf

3. “The Importance of Younger Adults.” R.J. Reynolds. 27 Feb 1998. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eyn18c00/pdf

4. Johnston, M.E. “Young Smokers Prevalence, Trends, Implications and Related Demographic Trends.” Philip Morris. 31 March 1981. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fts84a00/pdf

Gift for Daddy – img4400

by

Depictions of children with their mothers or fathers in cigarette ads have the enormous ability to reinforce the respectability of smoking as a part of normal family life. Because this perception is often promulgated by the tobacco industry, it is no surprise that many tobacco advertisements took advantage of Father’s Day. Indeed, many print ads, particularly from the Baby Boomer era, depict children gifting cigarette cartons to their fathers. The images of youngsters worked to send a reassuring message to consumers about the healthfulness of the product, as youngsters represent purity, vibrancy, and life – concepts which can be dangerous when tied to tobacco products. An R.J. Reynolds ad from 1953, for example, depicts a woman and her two children ready to surprise Dad with Cavaliers. The accompanying text speaks directly to children, essentially selling the tobacco products to kids: “Make your Dad’s eyes light up…as he lights up his favorite smoke…with love from you to him on Father’s Day” 1953

Young Smokers – img3882

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The ads in this theme, featuring attractive, smiling, young models, blatantly target teens and young adults. This theme spans decades of cigarette ads targeting youth, from the 1920s Fatima cigarettes slogan, “the younger crowd,” to the 1930s and ’40s Old Gold slogan, “for young ideas,” to the 1950s Philip Morris slogan “for those with keen, young tastes.” Internal industry documents show that young people have been (and remain today) a key marketing target for tobacco companies.

Most smokers do not begin smoking as adults. Almost all new smokers, the lifeblood of the industry, are teens and young adults aged 13 to 21. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1973 reveals the long-seeded emphasis on targeting teens with cigarette ads: “Realistically, if our Company is to survive and prosper, over the long term, we must get our share of the youth market” (1). In the 1980s, R.J.R. placed a stronger emphasis on the necessity of hooking teens early, claiming that “younger adult smokers have been the critical factor in the growth and decline of every major brand and company over the last 50 years. They will continue to be just as important to brands/companies in the future…” (2). Later in this same document, the company literally refers to its smokers as if they assets, claiming that a young smoker “appreciates in value over time because of increased consumption.” Decades later, the sentiment that youth must be targeted remains prevalent. A more recent R.J. Reynolds document from 1998 explains that because only 31% of smokers begin smoking after age 18, and only 5% after age 24, “younger adults are the only source of replacement smokers” once adult smokers pass away (3).

The emphasis on targeting teens was by no means restricted to R.J. Reynolds. An internal Philip Morris document from 1981 explains that the teen market is “particularly important,” because “today’s teenager is tomorrow’s potential regular customer, and the overwhelming majority of smokers first begin to smoke while still in their teens” (4). Even after harsh criticism from activists and policy makers, tobacco companies continue to advertise to the youth market. While they claim they target only “informed adults” of at least 21 years, recent ad campaigns tell a different story. Take a look at some of our other themes, including “Flavored Tobacco,” “Joe Camel,” “Newport Teases Teens,” and “Recent Menthol” to discover Big Tobacco’s ongoing teen marketing campaigns.

Abroad, where regulation is less strict, flagrant targeting of youth in cigarette ads remains rampant. Bright pink ads for Kiss cigarettes in Russia, using fresh-faced girls enjoying lollipops and ice cream cones, exemplify the dangers of tobacco advertising with next to zero regulations.

1. Teague, Claude E. “Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth Market.” R.J. Reynolds. 2 Feb 1973. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mqu46b00/pdf

2. Burrows, D.S. “Younger Adult Smokers: Strategies and Opportunities.” R.J. Reynolds. 29 February 1984. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tqq46b00/pdf

3. “The Importance of Younger Adults.” R.J. Reynolds. 27 Feb 1998. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eyn18c00/pdf

4. Johnston, M.E. “Young Smokers Prevalence, Trends, Implications and Related Demographic Trends.” Philip Morris. 31 March 1981. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fts84a00/pdf

Mild as May – img3273

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Tobacco companies have been advertising their particular brands as “mild” since the first half of the 20th century. From the start, smokers were aware that smoking irritated the throat, causing discomfort or “smoker’s hack.” Though serious health effects of smoking, like lung cancer, emphysema, and heart attack, were not yet identified in the first half of the 20th century, the seemingly benign side effects such as sore throat and cough were certainly bothersome to smokers. To counteract the sentiment that certain cigarettes were “harsh” and thereby worse for one’s health, cigarette companies began touting “mildness,” a ploy that has lasted well into the 21st century. By reassuring smokers that a particular brand was “mild,” tobacco companies succeeded in hooking consumers and preventing them from quitting.

In the 1930s, Philip Morris used “mildness” in an attempt to attract women, classifying Marlboros as “Mild as May.” Similarly, the American Tobacco Company, always struggling to maintain Lucky Strike’s female consumer base due to the brand’s inherently unfashionable packaging, employed the slogan, “Mildness and Character” along with images of beautiful, sophisticated, rich women. But a cigarette advertised as “mild” was by no means restricted to a female audience. Indeed, in the 1940s and ‘50s, Liggett & Myers drove home the “mildness” message in many of its Chesterfield ads that featured males. A good portion of these Chesterfield ads even included celebrity endorsements from famous men, including Ronald Reagan.

The deception continued and became increasingly prevalent as low-tar and low-nicotine cigarettes gained ground in the 1970s. At this time, Brown & Williamson released Kool Milds in an attempt to attract the health-conscious smoker. B&W continued advertising Kool Milds heavily until 2010, when FDA regulations prohibited tobacco companies from using misleading monikers such as “low” and “mild.” Since this new regulation, Kool has followed other brands in color-coding its cigarettes to indicate “mild” or “low-tar.” It has now repositioned Kool Milds as Kool Blue.

Protects Your Health – img1967

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This theme features a variety of ads professing health benefits for filter cigarettes, although filters did little to truly reduce the hazards of smoking. Indeed, tobacco industry chemists were well aware that most filters actually removed no more tar and nicotine than would the same length of tobacco. However, a series of Reader’s Digest articles worked to publicize these dubious health claims for filters in the 1950s.

One such article, entitled “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” (1950), notes that artificial filters “take out some nicotine” since people are “aware that nicotine is a killer” (1). The article states that silica-gel cartridges remove 60% of nicotine from cigarettes. This article spurred Viceroy to print advertisements a week later which read, “Reader's Digest tells why filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health.” These health claims sparked a boom in Viceroy cigarette sales as well as an onslaught of new filter cigarette brands flooding the market. Kent was introduced in 1952 with a filter made of treated asbestos on crepe paper. In 1953, L&M followed with a “miracle tip” and Philip Morris advertised its di-ethylene glycol (Di-Gl) filter cigarette as “the cigarette that takes the FEAR out of smoking.” In the next two years, Marlboro was re-released as a filter cigarette which targeted men (it had previously been a cigarette targeting women, with a “beauty tip to protect the lips”), and Winston was introduced with a hefty advertising budget of $15 million.

Leading the pack with health claims was Kent, with ads that read, “What a wonderful feeling to know that Kent filters best of all leading filter cigarettes!” (1958) and “You’ll feel better about smoking with the taste of Kent!” (1961). Ironically, Kent’s filter contained asbestos, a mineral known to cause mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. In fact, the asbestos in Kent’s filter was crocidolite asbestos (also known as blue asbestos), which is often considered the deadliest form of the fibrous mineral.

1. Riis, R.W. Reader’s Digest. “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” 7 Jan 1999. .

Protects Your Health – img1968

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This theme features a variety of ads professing health benefits for filter cigarettes, although filters did little to truly reduce the hazards of smoking. Indeed, tobacco industry chemists were well aware that most filters actually removed no more tar and nicotine than would the same length of tobacco. However, a series of Reader’s Digest articles worked to publicize these dubious health claims for filters in the 1950s.

One such article, entitled “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” (1950), notes that artificial filters “take out some nicotine” since people are “aware that nicotine is a killer” (1). The article states that silica-gel cartridges remove 60% of nicotine from cigarettes. This article spurred Viceroy to print advertisements a week later which read, “Reader's Digest tells why filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health.” These health claims sparked a boom in Viceroy cigarette sales as well as an onslaught of new filter cigarette brands flooding the market. Kent was introduced in 1952 with a filter made of treated asbestos on crepe paper. In 1953, L&M followed with a “miracle tip” and Philip Morris advertised its di-ethylene glycol (Di-Gl) filter cigarette as “the cigarette that takes the FEAR out of smoking.” In the next two years, Marlboro was re-released as a filter cigarette which targeted men (it had previously been a cigarette targeting women, with a “beauty tip to protect the lips”), and Winston was introduced with a hefty advertising budget of $15 million.

Leading the pack with health claims was Kent, with ads that read, “What a wonderful feeling to know that Kent filters best of all leading filter cigarettes!” (1958) and “You’ll feel better about smoking with the taste of Kent!” (1961). Ironically, Kent’s filter contained asbestos, a mineral known to cause mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. In fact, the asbestos in Kent’s filter was crocidolite asbestos (also known as blue asbestos), which is often considered the deadliest form of the fibrous mineral.

1. Riis, R.W. Reader’s Digest. “How Harmful are Cigarettes?” 7 Jan 1999. .

Pipes – ing5814

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Pipes and loose pipe tobacco are often advertised directly to men, and, indeed, are represented as highly masculinized and often genteel. Yello-bole pipes, for example, advertises for “The All-Male taste,” and Flying Dutchman pipe tobacco claims that their tobacco will allow men to “lead women around by the nose.” Further, one ad for Tuxedo tobacco implies that smoking a pipe is a pleasure offered only to men, while a famous actress sighs, “The fragrance of pipe tobacco makes me wish I were a man.”

Beyond the masculinity approach, many pipe ads focus on throat ease, since unlike cigarette smoke, pipe smoke cannot be inhaled due to its high alkalinity. Though these ads advertise health benefits for pipe smoking – Kaywoodie claims that “pipe smokers live longer” and the Medico pipe claims it “gives you pleasure and peace of mind” – pipe smoking is associated with higher incidences of oral cancers than cigarette smoking, and nicotine is absorbed in higher levels as well.