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Stanford Research into the Impact of Tobacco Advertising

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Early Black Ads – img6722

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As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Early Black Ads – img8885

by

As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Early Black Ads – img8886

by

As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Early Black Ads – img9147

by

As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Early Black Ads – img9148

by

As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Early Black Ads – img9149

by

As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Early Black Ads – img9150

by

As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Early Black Ads – img9151

by

As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Makes you Sick – img12693

by

The Association for Smokers Awareness (ADESF) launched the Makes You Sick campaign in Brazil in 2012. As its title suggests, the campaign aimed to increase awareness of how smoking physiologically harms our bodies. The advertisements regarding the plane, submarine, and rocket incidents are different from the typical advertisements that display health effects of smoking—which usually show negative, visceral images of the body and specific organs—because they are more abstract in portraying these effects: they draw an analogy between how one faulty part of a machine led to many deaths and how smoking negatively impacts human health.

The black-and-white color scheme allows the viewer to notice the complex framework of the airplane, submarine, and rocket. This highlights the complexities of our own individual bodies and how all the individual parts work together to allow us to perform the biological functions that keep us alive. Therefore, if even one part of the complex machine we call our body is damaged through smoking, it can have catastrophic effects on our overall wellbeing.

Although these advertisements succeed in emphasizing how even the slightest damage to our bodies due to smoking can ultimately have a drastic impact, they would be more effective if accompanied by information about how to seek aid regarding quitting, as “fear appeals are most effective when accompanied by equally strong efficacy messages, such as information to call a quitline for help.”

References:

http://www.tobaccofreeflorida.com/powerfuladswork/#sthash.UuXoIU6P.dpuf

Smoke Anywhere – img20836

by

Freedom is possibly America’s most treasured value. Protected in the “Bill of Rights,” it is a deeply held core belief that to many Americans was a birthright and to some a hard fought victory. Given its hold on the American psyche, it has been used as a powerful marketing tool to hawk products as diverse as airplane tickets for Southwest Airlines, which calls itself “A Symbol of Freedom,” to getting a good night’s sleep with Dacron pillows, which is “America’s Freedom Fabric,” to the freedom to discover the road ahead with Chevrolet’s “Find New Roads,” and the freedom to “Just Do it” with Nike products.

E-cigarette (e-cig) companies have jumped on the freedom bandwagon and promise many kinds of freedom to vapers. A key selling point touted by e-cig companies is that their products can be used in places where smoking of traditional cigarettes is banned, like bars, restaurants, on flights, and in entertainment and sporting venues. An ad for Vapestick shows a woman vaping her e-cig in bed. The slogan of the ad reads, “Looks, Feels, and Tastes like a Real Cigarette That You Can Smoke Anywhere!”. A Cannastick ad shows people enjoying a concert under the caption “The Freedom to Vape Anywhere.” An ad for Cigana has the image of an airplane and is accompanied by the following text, “Smoke without the smoke…. Smoke like no one is watching.” A Vega Vapor ad tells consumers that many “local establishments are vapor friendly.”

The Smoke Anywhere theme is also widely publicized on brand websites. For instance, Blu e-cigs, says on its website, “blu e-cigs® electronic cigarettes are not traditional cigarettes and do not burn tobacco, so they can be smoked in bars, restaurants, offices and other places where normal smoking bans are in effect.” Fin e-cigs on its website says the brand is for individuals “…who want the freedom to smoke in places where traditional cigarettes are not permitted.

While e-cigs offer many freedoms to its users, a freedom that it cannot offer but it often promises is the freedom to smoke anywhere. Despite ads, eg. Blu and Vapestick, that show individuals vape on airplanes, the US Department of Transportation has issued guidelines restricting the use of e-cigs on flights. More restaurants are also coming forward to ban vaping on their premises. For instance, fast food giant Taco Bell has banned vaping in its premises.

Smoke Anywhere – img20837

by

Freedom is possibly America’s most treasured value. Protected in the “Bill of Rights,” it is a deeply held core belief that to many Americans was a birthright and to some a hard fought victory. Given its hold on the American psyche, it has been used as a powerful marketing tool to hawk products as diverse as airplane tickets for Southwest Airlines, which calls itself “A Symbol of Freedom,” to getting a good night’s sleep with Dacron pillows, which is “America’s Freedom Fabric,” to the freedom to discover the road ahead with Chevrolet’s “Find New Roads,” and the freedom to “Just Do it” with Nike products.

E-cigarette (e-cig) companies have jumped on the freedom bandwagon and promise many kinds of freedom to vapers. A key selling point touted by e-cig companies is that their products can be used in places where smoking of traditional cigarettes is banned, like bars, restaurants, on flights, and in entertainment and sporting venues. An ad for Vapestick shows a woman vaping her e-cig in bed. The slogan of the ad reads, “Looks, Feels, and Tastes like a Real Cigarette That You Can Smoke Anywhere!”. A Cannastick ad shows people enjoying a concert under the caption “The Freedom to Vape Anywhere.” An ad for Cigana has the image of an airplane and is accompanied by the following text, “Smoke without the smoke…. Smoke like no one is watching.” A Vega Vapor ad tells consumers that many “local establishments are vapor friendly.”

The Smoke Anywhere theme is also widely publicized on brand websites. For instance, Blu e-cigs, says on its website, “blu e-cigs® electronic cigarettes are not traditional cigarettes and do not burn tobacco, so they can be smoked in bars, restaurants, offices and other places where normal smoking bans are in effect.” Fin e-cigs on its website says the brand is for individuals “…who want the freedom to smoke in places where traditional cigarettes are not permitted.

While e-cigs offer many freedoms to its users, a freedom that it cannot offer but it often promises is the freedom to smoke anywhere. Despite ads, eg. Blu and Vapestick, that show individuals vape on airplanes, the US Department of Transportation has issued guidelines restricting the use of e-cigs on flights. More restaurants are also coming forward to ban vaping on their premises. For instance, fast food giant Taco Bell has banned vaping in its premises.

Early Black Ads – img6727

by

As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Pseudoscience – img1584

by

In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Early Black Ads – img6728

by

As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Pseudoscience – img1589

by

In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Pseudoscience – img1590

by

In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Pseudoscience – img1591

by

In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Pseudoscience – img1592

by

In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Pseudoscience – img1593

by

In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Pseudoscience – img6779

by

In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Early Black Ads – img6725

by

As World War II came to a close, tobacco companies needed to expand to “new” markets in order to maintain prosperity. At this point, they began issuing mass marketing efforts targeting African Americans. Whereas there was minor advertising in weekly African Americans newspapers prior to the war, scholars cite a number of post-war changes as the sources for the surge in market expansion, mainly the growth in urban migration and the steadily increasing incomes of African Americans in the 1940s (1). One scholar explains that “between 1920 and 1943, the annual income of African Americans increased threefold, from $3 billion to more than $10 billion,” making the population an increasingly appealing demographic for the tobacco industry (2). Indeed, advertising and marketing magazines published many articles at the time describing the profitable “emerging Negro market.” One such article from 1944, for example, was titled, “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home” (3). A subsequent article printed a year later provided a table depicting “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943 (4). The table revealed that the amount of money African Americans spent on tobacco products increased six-fold from 1920 to 1943.

Perhaps the catalyzing force in the tobacco industry’s foray into African American targeting came in the form of emerging advertising avenues that could be used to target African American populations without alienating whites; the 1940s saw the introduction of a number of glossy monthly magazines including Negro Digest (1942, renamed Black World), Ebony (1945) and Negro Achievements (1947, renamed Sepia). These mass-media publications were much more attractive to advertisers than the African American daily newspapers of the pre-war era, with glossy pages and a larger national distribution. The magazines, because they were intended for a purely African American audience, also provided advertisers with an opportunity to run ads featuring African American models away from the eyes of white consumers.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal the massive development of the African American market in the 1940s and its impact on the tobacco industry. Public Relations firms specializing in targeting African American populations sent materials to the major tobacco companies hoping to secure business partnerships. One PR firm, in correspondence with RJ Reynolds in 1949, reminded the company that, “The negro market is a big one. I sincerely hope that I may have the opportunity [sic] of helping to further cultivate it for you” (5).

The major tobacco companies all made inroads on the “Negro market” in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Indeed, before the invent of such avenues, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the only ads featuring African Americans were racist advertisements using black caricatures, a striking contrast to the depictions seen in African American publications from the late 1940s to early 1950s, which featured African American models as professionals, students, and famous athletes. An advertising trade magazine, Printer’s Ink, described how, in 1947, the American Tobacco Company “entered the Negro market with a series of Famous Firsts about Negroes that were eye-openers to many in advertising” (6). The article describes the campaign content as telling “the history of some of the outstanding achievements of the Negroes,” most of which, according to the article, “were little known to students of the race.” Examples of these spotlights included Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and “some of the modern Negro notables.” The Printer’s Ink article explains that the campaign intends to market cigarettes to African Americans by demonstrating “to the Negro that his race has accomplished many things.”

Tobacco advertising methods targeting African Americans shifted in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s with the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and just as there was economic and market pressure in the 1940s to increase marketing efforts to African Americans, the 1970s and 1980s sparked resurgence in these efforts. An R.J. Reynolds document from 1969, for example, marks an increase in “Negro purchasing power” from 3 billion in 1940 to 32 billion in 1970. At this point, in order to refocus attention on the African American population and strengthen their ties to the community, tobacco companies worked on promotional campaigns, which funded key organizations such as the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the United Negro College Fund. An internal Brown & Williamson document declares that the “relatively small and often tight knit community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage if exploited properly. Peer pressure plays a more important role in many phases of life in the minority community. Therefore, dominance of the market place and the community environment is necessary to successfully increase sales there” (7).

As the industry began sponsoring African American institutions and charities, they also shifted their print advertising techniques to reflect the changing political climate. Increasingly, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1971 shows a man and a woman, both wearing Afros, talking on the phone together and smoking cigarettes, the slogan “Rap’n Kent” underneath.

One scholar describes advertisements from the early 1960s as portraying a “racially desegregated society in which the discerning tastes and values of black consumers were highlighted” (3). But she notes a shift with the emergence of Black Power, in which ads were able to latch onto the Black Nationalism movement while completely avoiding the political ideology therein. Instead, the ads worked at “selling soul,” and “invoked themes of black pride, solidarity, and “soul style.” Indeed, a Viceroy ad campaign from 1970 demonstrates a carefully crafted combination of both approaches. One ad from the campaign shows a stylish couple – the man in a suit and the woman in a yellow mod mini-dress – shopping at an outdoor art boutique while smoking. The caption reads, “Their collection? It’s fun to build on. Their apartment looks like a gallery. With everything from Neo-Afro realism to their child’s finger painting. Their cigarettes? Viceroy. They won’t settle for anything less. It’s a matter of taste.” This ad exemplifies the industry’s blatant attempts at exploiting Black Nationalism. An internal Brown & Williamson document from 1969 reveals that tobacco companies were indeed using this theme to market cigarettes: “The desire for blackness, or soul, as part of solving their identity crisis is something that must be understood. A sense of identity is being accentuated because today, as never before, Negroes are taking pride in themselves” (8). Viceroy, like many of the other leading brands, also capitalized on this “soul” movement. Another ad from the same series features four African Americans at a nightclub enjoying drinks and cigarettes while listening to a musician. White people sit in the background enjoying the same music. The caption for this ad reads, “Their sounds? They like ‘em heavy. And with soul. The music not only has to say something. It has to move.”

At this time, menthols also emerged as a cigarette targeting African-Americans. Whereas in the past, menthol cigarettes had been advertised to the general population as an occasional cigarette to smoke when sick or suffering from smoker’s cough, the 1960s brought along the beginnings of a different image for the menthol cigarette. In 1969 alone, Lorillard increased its “Negro market budget” by 87% over 1968 due to the introduction of its menthol cigarette, Newport, to the African American market. Likewise, British American Tobacco doubled their budget from 1968 to 1969 in order to increase African-American radio station coverage for its menthol cigarette, Kool, as well as for Viceroy, which targeted African American stations (8). Today, over 70% of African-American smokers smoke menthols as opposed to only 35% of white smokers (9).

1. Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power:” Susannah Walker. (University of Chicago Press, Jul 15, 2009 )

2. Walker, Susannah. “Style & Status: Selling Beauty to African American Women, 1920-1975”

3. Sullivan, David J. “The American Negro—An ‘Export’ Market at Home!” Printer’s Ink; 208:3. 21 July 1944:90.

4 Sullivan, David J. “How Negroes Spent Their Incomes, 1920-1943.” Sales Management. 15 June 1945.

5. “Thank You Very Much For Your Letter of the 23rd.” RJ Reynolds. 31 March 1949. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bwz79d00

6. “—No Title—.” American Tobacco. 26 Nov 1948. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vaj41a00

7. “Discussion Paper: Total Minority Marketing Plan,” 7 Sept 1984. Http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dmf41f00

8. “A Study of Ethnic Markets.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Sept 1969. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/paq76b00

9. Gardiner, Phillip S. “The African Americanization of menthol cigarette use in the United States.” Nicotine & Tobacco Research Vol.6 Supp. 1. Feb 2004.

Pseudoscience – img9479

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In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Pseudoscience – img11571

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In the first half of the twentieth century, popular faith in medicine was exploited by a series of tobacco industry-sponsored “research” and “surveys” which made its way into cigarette advertising. In this era, before the coming of the atomic bomb, little of today’s cynicism existed concerning the abilities of science to overcome societal problems. To take advantage of this popular sentiment, the industry sponsored “research institutes” and scientific symposia, many of which amounted to little more than propaganda based upon dubious methodology. Health claims were then made on the basis of these so-called studies, as when Chesterfields were advertised in 1952 under the assertion that “Nose, throat, and accessory organs [were] not adversely affected” after a six-month period of medical observation (including X-rays) by ear, nose, and throat specialists.

Targeting Black Women – img9212

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In targeting black women, tobacco companies often portray an image of a strong, independent black woman. Increasingly, in the 1960s and 1970s, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1968 features a glamorous black woman wearing an Afro and luxurious jewelry next to the slogan, “Kent smokes… and that’s where it’s at.” Recent Salem ads from the 2000s feature the slogan, “Stir the senses,” and each ad depicts a sexy black woman smoking in green, mentholated ecstasy. A Camel ad from 2001 portrays a beautiful black woman singing in a nightclub in the “diva” tradition of Whitney Houston and Beyoncé Knowles. A Virginia Slims campaign from roughly the same time used the slogan “Find Your Voice” coupled with images of strong African women. For example, an ad from the campaign in 2000 features a woman in traditional clothing, balancing bolts of fabric on her head. The text beside her, half in Swahili, reads,”Kila mtu ana uzuri wake – No single institution owns the copyright for BEAUTY.” In this way, Virginia Slims portrays an image of accepting diverse standards of beauty.

Targeting Black Women – img9213

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In targeting black women, tobacco companies often portray an image of a strong, independent black woman. Increasingly, in the 1960s and 1970s, models wearing “naturals” or Afros began popping up in ads for Newport, L&M, Kent, Kool, and many more. A Kent ad from 1968 features a glamorous black woman wearing an Afro and luxurious jewelry next to the slogan, “Kent smokes… and that’s where it’s at.” Recent Salem ads from the 2000s feature the slogan, “Stir the senses,” and each ad depicts a sexy black woman smoking in green, mentholated ecstasy. A Camel ad from 2001 portrays a beautiful black woman singing in a nightclub in the “diva” tradition of Whitney Houston and Beyoncé Knowles. A Virginia Slims campaign from roughly the same time used the slogan “Find Your Voice” coupled with images of strong African women. For example, an ad from the campaign in 2000 features a woman in traditional clothing, balancing bolts of fabric on her head. The text beside her, half in Swahili, reads,”Kila mtu ana uzuri wake – No single institution owns the copyright for BEAUTY.” In this way, Virginia Slims portrays an image of accepting diverse standards of beauty.

Light – img11617

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The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Kool Your Throat – img9494

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In 1933, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company released Kools as its answer to the mentholated cigarette. Menthol cigarettes were introduced in the 1930s as specialty cigarettes to be smoked on occasion, aside from a smoker’s regular, unmentholated cigarette. Because menthol is a mint extract which triggers a sensation of coolness when it comes in contact with the mouth and throat, advertisers often touted menthols’ coolness as a contrast to the hotness of ordinary tobacco smoke. Implicit in this advertising technique are the harmful effects of smoking, sometimes referred to as “smoker’s hack” in Kools ads.

Instead of advising smokers to quit, however, these early ads for Kools from the 1930s to 1950s urged smokers to switch to a menthol brand to ease throat irritation. Early slogans for Kools covered by this theme include “Your throat will not get dry” (1933), “Throat comfort” (1934), and “In between others, rest your throat with KOOLS” (1938-1940). By 1940, the slogan was “Switch from Hots to Kools,” and in 1951 and 1952, a Sunday comics campaign was released. Across the board, the message was the same – Kools were soothing, comfortable, and relaxing.

Kools’ penguin mascot was used from the first days of the brand’s release. His cartoonish appearance, like Joe Camel’s, makes him an attractive figure to kids and young adults. The penguin was named Willie in 1947 to increase sales which had fallen after the war. However, Kools were still seen as a specialty product at the time, appealing only to those smokers hoping to avoid throat dryness or the irritating effects of their regular smokes. It wasn’t until the late 1950s, when Salem entered the scene as the first menthol filter in 1956, that menthols began to make up a large part of the market share. Government surveys in 2011 revealed that menthol cigarettes dominate 30% of the overall market, and over 80% of black smokers prefer menthol as opposed to 22% of non-Hispanic white smokers (1).

1. Wilson, Duff. “Advisory Panel urges F.D.A. to re-examine menthol in cigarettes.” The New York Times. 18 March 2011. .

Light – img11618

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The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11619

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The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11620

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The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11621

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The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11622

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The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11623

by

The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11624

by

The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11625

by

The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11626

by

The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11627

by

The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11628

by

The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11629

by

The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Light – img11630

by

The ads in this theme document the decades of deceptive advertisement campaigns for “light” cigarettes. In the 1970s, the tobacco industry began heavily promoting “light” cigarettes as low-tar and low-nicotine alternatives to quitting. However, the FDA has determined that light and ultra-light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. In fact, internal industry documents reveal that from the very beginning, tobacco companies were well aware that smokers compensated for the low-nicotine draw from light cigarettes by changing their smoking behaviors. A brand of cigarette, for example, might register on the FTC Test Method as containing 12 mg of “tar” and 0.9 mg of nicotine per cigarette, but in actuality, a human smoker of the same brand would be able to receive much more tar and nicotine than the “machine smoker” by smoking the light cigarette in a different manner.

Indeed, since the 1966 release of the ISO machine-smoking method (used by the FTC to determine the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yield of cigarettes), the industry has worked intensively to create a product that would outsmart the testing equipment. For one, the tobacco companies discovered that added perforations on cigarette filters resulted in low tar and nicotine readings from the FTC Test Method, as clean air diluted the smoke “inhaled” by the machine; however, human smokers, unlike the machine smoker, are smoking for the nicotine kick. Often, this desire for nicotine causes human smokers to take longer, bigger, or quicker puffs on light cigarettes, since the cigarette provides “less” nicotine per normal puff. Additionally, smokers of light cigarettes often smoke more cigarettes per day than smokers of regular cigarettes. Sometimes (usually in the case of super light or ultra light cigarettes), smokers instinctively cover the perforations on the filters with their lips or fingers as they draw in, resulting in a very high intake of nicotine and tar from the cigarette (1). Because of these wide variations between human smokers and machine smokers, the FTC Test Method is now widely considered to be misleading for consumers.

The FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, and with this change came many new regulations, one of which directly concerns light cigarettes: As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products as they cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising. Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

1. Kozlowski, T. and R. J. O’Connor. “Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents.” Tobacco Control. 2002; 11: i40-i50. http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i40.full

Let's Smoke Girls – img11796

by

Before the First World War, smoking was associated with the “loose morals” of prostitutes and wayward women. Clever marketers managed to turn this around in the 1920s and 1930s, latching onto women’s liberation movements and transforming cigarettes into symbols of women’s independence. In 1929, as part of this effort, the American Tobacco Company organized marches of women carrying “Torches of Freedom” (i.e., cigarettes) down New York’s 5th Avenue to emphasize their emancipation. The tobacco industry also sponsored training sessions to teach women how to smoke, and competitions for most delicate smoker. Many of the advertisements targeting women throughout the decades have concentrated on women’s empowerment. Early examples include “I wish I were a man” so I could smoke (Velvet, 1912), while later examples like “You’ve come a long way baby” (Virginia Slims) were more clearly exploitive of the Women’s Liberation Movement. It is interesting to note that the Marlboro brand, famous for its macho “Marlboro Man,” was for decades a woman’s cigarette (“Mild as May” with “Ivory tips to protect the lips”) before it underwent an abrupt sex change in 1954. Only 5 percent of American women smoked in 1923 versus 12 percent in 1932 and 33 percent in 1965 (the peak year). Lung cancer was still a rare disease for women in the 1950s, though by the year 2000 it was killing nearly 70,000 women per year. Cancer of the lung surpassed breast cancer as the leading cause of cancer death among women in 1987.

Let's Smoke Girls – img11797

by

Before the First World War, smoking was associated with the “loose morals” of prostitutes and wayward women. Clever marketers managed to turn this around in the 1920s and 1930s, latching onto women’s liberation movements and transforming cigarettes into symbols of women’s independence. In 1929, as part of this effort, the American Tobacco Company organized marches of women carrying “Torches of Freedom” (i.e., cigarettes) down New York’s 5th Avenue to emphasize their emancipation. The tobacco industry also sponsored training sessions to teach women how to smoke, and competitions for most delicate smoker. Many of the advertisements targeting women throughout the decades have concentrated on women’s empowerment. Early examples include “I wish I were a man” so I could smoke (Velvet, 1912), while later examples like “You’ve come a long way baby” (Virginia Slims) were more clearly exploitive of the Women’s Liberation Movement. It is interesting to note that the Marlboro brand, famous for its macho “Marlboro Man,” was for decades a woman’s cigarette (“Mild as May” with “Ivory tips to protect the lips”) before it underwent an abrupt sex change in 1954. Only 5 percent of American women smoked in 1923 versus 12 percent in 1932 and 33 percent in 1965 (the peak year). Lung cancer was still a rare disease for women in the 1950s, though by the year 2000 it was killing nearly 70,000 women per year. Cancer of the lung surpassed breast cancer as the leading cause of cancer death among women in 1987.

Let's Smoke Girls – img11798

by

Before the First World War, smoking was associated with the “loose morals” of prostitutes and wayward women. Clever marketers managed to turn this around in the 1920s and 1930s, latching onto women’s liberation movements and transforming cigarettes into symbols of women’s independence. In 1929, as part of this effort, the American Tobacco Company organized marches of women carrying “Torches of Freedom” (i.e., cigarettes) down New York’s 5th Avenue to emphasize their emancipation. The tobacco industry also sponsored training sessions to teach women how to smoke, and competitions for most delicate smoker. Many of the advertisements targeting women throughout the decades have concentrated on women’s empowerment. Early examples include “I wish I were a man” so I could smoke (Velvet, 1912), while later examples like “You’ve come a long way baby” (Virginia Slims) were more clearly exploitive of the Women’s Liberation Movement. It is interesting to note that the Marlboro brand, famous for its macho “Marlboro Man,” was for decades a woman’s cigarette (“Mild as May” with “Ivory tips to protect the lips”) before it underwent an abrupt sex change in 1954. Only 5 percent of American women smoked in 1923 versus 12 percent in 1932 and 33 percent in 1965 (the peak year). Lung cancer was still a rare disease for women in the 1950s, though by the year 2000 it was killing nearly 70,000 women per year. Cancer of the lung surpassed breast cancer as the leading cause of cancer death among women in 1987.

Let's Smoke Girls – img11799

by

Before the First World War, smoking was associated with the “loose morals” of prostitutes and wayward women. Clever marketers managed to turn this around in the 1920s and 1930s, latching onto women’s liberation movements and transforming cigarettes into symbols of women’s independence. In 1929, as part of this effort, the American Tobacco Company organized marches of women carrying “Torches of Freedom” (i.e., cigarettes) down New York’s 5th Avenue to emphasize their emancipation. The tobacco industry also sponsored training sessions to teach women how to smoke, and competitions for most delicate smoker. Many of the advertisements targeting women throughout the decades have concentrated on women’s empowerment. Early examples include “I wish I were a man” so I could smoke (Velvet, 1912), while later examples like “You’ve come a long way baby” (Virginia Slims) were more clearly exploitive of the Women’s Liberation Movement. It is interesting to note that the Marlboro brand, famous for its macho “Marlboro Man,” was for decades a woman’s cigarette (“Mild as May” with “Ivory tips to protect the lips”) before it underwent an abrupt sex change in 1954. Only 5 percent of American women smoked in 1923 versus 12 percent in 1932 and 33 percent in 1965 (the peak year). Lung cancer was still a rare disease for women in the 1950s, though by the year 2000 it was killing nearly 70,000 women per year. Cancer of the lung surpassed breast cancer as the leading cause of cancer death among women in 1987.